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Psychological Distress, Mental Disorder, and 
Assessment of Decisionmaking Capacity Under 
U.S. Medical Aid in Dying Statutes 
LOIS A. WEITHORN† 
This Article examines concepts of treatment decisionmaking capacity relevant to medical aid in 
dying as it is currently authorized in the United States. In order to be eligible for medical aid in 
dying in one of the ten jurisdictions now allowing such assistance, patients must be capable of 
making an informed health care decision. Under many of the governing statutes, special 
attention is given to whether a patient is “suffering from,” for example, “a psychiatric or 
psychological disorder or depression” that is causing impaired judgment. 
This Article analyzes the pertinent statutory provisions, examining the meaning of terms such as 
“capacity” and “impaired judgment” within the context of the law of informed consent. It 
further considers strategies for assessing treatment decisionmaking capacity, with particular 
attention to the relevant scientific evidence.  
This Article emphasizes the importance of avoiding presumptions that persons with mental 
disorders or other psychological conditions are not competent to make their own treatment 
decisions. It proposes reliance on criterion-relevant evaluations of decisionmaking capacity that 
operationalize legal standards of competence, consistent with theory and research. It 
recommends against a higher threshold for determining capacity to decide about medical aid in 
dying as contrasted with other health care decisions relating to survival near the end of life. 
Finally, it encourages practitioners to adopt a broad formulation of palliative care in 
discharging their statutory obligation to inform patients of alternatives to medical aid in dying. 
Such formulations of palliative and comfort care should incorporate the range of appropriate 
psychosocial, psychotherapeutic, and psychopharmacological interventions. Any patient 
experiencing psychological distress should be fully informed about, and given timely access to, 
interventions that may provide relief from that suffering. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over a quarter of a century has passed since Oregon stunned the nation by 
legalizing medical aid in dying.1 Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act provides a 
process by which a patient diagnosed with a “terminal” (that is, “incurable and 
irreversible”) disease, whose life expectancy does not exceed six months, can 
request a prescription for subsequent self-administration “for the purpose of 
ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.”2 Currently, a person 
suffering from a terminal disease who meets eligibility criteria is permitted to 
receive physician assistance to hasten death in ten jurisdictions within the United 
States (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Washington, Vermont, and the District of Columbia).3 Oregon’s framework 
provided the model for the statutes of seven states and the District of Columbia, 
and for patterns of practice in a tenth jurisdiction, Montana, where no statute 
currently regulates medical aid in dying following legalization by the state 
supreme court.4  
All of those jurisdictions authorizing medical aid in dying)5 require 
participating physicians to provide patients who seek authorization with full 
information about statutorily enumerated elements of disclosure. That is, the 
attending physician is required to provide patients with information including, 
 
 1. Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–897 (2017), was passed by ballot initiative 
(51.31% to 48.69%) in 1994. Oregon Measure 16, Physician-Assisted Death Initiative (1994), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Measure_16,_Physician-Assisted_Death_Initiative_(1994); see infra note 22 
and accompanying text. 
 2. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805 (2017). 
 3. As of the time of this writing, medical aid in dying is permitted by statute in California, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington, Vermont, and the District of Columbia, and by state supreme 
court decision in Montana. The pace at which states have adopted medical aid in dying statutes has picked up in 
recent years. See infra notes 22–30 and accompanying text.   
 4. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009). As indicated below, our research suggests that, in 
the absence of statutory guidance, Montana’s health care professionals follow the standards and practices for 
medical aid in dying in Oregon. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 5. The following terms have been used interchangeably: medical aid in dying, medically assisted death, 
physician assisted death, and physician aid in dying. In Oregon and several other jurisdictions, the term “death 
with dignity” refers to this option. The label “physician assisted suicide,” prevalent previously, is now disfavored 
because experts in mental health distinguish suicide from the type of medical assistance discussed in this Article. 
See AM. ASS’N OF SUICIDOLOGY, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SUICIDOLOGY: “SUICIDE” IS 
NOT THE SAME AS “PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING” (2017), https://suicidology.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ 
AAS-PAD-Statement-Approved-10.30.17-ed-10-30-17.pdf. Experts in the study of suicide assert that suicide is 
a form of self-destruction, and sometimes a manifestation of a mental disorder, that can interrupt a life that might 
otherwise have continued for an extended period of time. Id. at 2–4. By contrast, medical aid in dying assists 
persons in hastening deaths that unavoidably occur within six months due to a terminal illness. Id. at 2. Under 
the aid in dying statutes, a decision to choose medical aid in dying is a way for a patient to exert some measure 
of control over the timing and manner of an already-impending death. Id. at 2–4; see Dan Nguyen & Joe Yager, 
Medical Aid in Dying: Ethical and Practical Issues for Psychiatrists, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018) 
https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/cme/medical-aid-dying-ethical-and-practical-issues-psychiatrists/page/0/1 
(“[S]uicide is defined by the act of intentional self-inflicted death, [whereas, when patients seek medical aid in 
dying,] the primary (although not proximal) cause of death is from a foreseeable underlying terminal illness.”);  
see also John Michael Bostwick & Lewis M. Cohen, Differentiating Suicide from Life-Ending Acts and End-of-
Life Decisions: A Model Based on Chronic Kidney Disease and Dialysis, 50 PSYCHOSOMATICS 1 (2009).  
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but not limited to, the patient’s diagnosis, prognosis, probable result of the 
prescribed medical aid in dying medication, and feasible alternatives including 
“comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.”6 In order for a patient to be 
eligible under the statute, the physician must also determine that the patient is 
“capable” of making “an informed decision” and of “acting voluntarily.”7 These 
requirements are consistent with the law governing health care decisions more 
generally, requiring that such decisions are made competently, voluntarily,8 and 
only after full disclosure of information material to patients’ decisions.9 
Patients who request medical aid in dying, and whose capacity to make 
health care decisions is questioned by the attending physician,10 must be referred 
to a mental health professional for further evaluation.11 The statutes of several 
states, including Oregon, instruct physicians to identify and refer patients who 
“may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression 
causing impaired judgment.”12 In New Jersey and two other states, there is no 
reference to mental disorder—physicians are to refer for mental health 
 
 6. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2017).   
 7. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.815, 127.820 (2017). 
 8. See Robert M. Nelson et al., The Concept of Voluntary Consent, 11 AM. J. BIOETHICS 6 (2011). The 
term “voluntariness” as a requirement for legally valid informed consent refers to a condition in which the 
patient’s decision is made free from controlling influences, such as coercion, manipulation, or situational 
constraints. Id. at 7-10. 
 9. See, e.g., JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 11 
(2d. ed. 2001); Alan Meisel et al., Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 285 (1977).  
 10.  Some authors and legal sources distinguish between the terms “capacity” and “competence” (or 
“competency”) in the context of treatment  decisionmaking. See Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency 
to Decide on Treatment and Research: MacArthur and Beyond,” 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 110 (1999) 
(“‘Capacity’ refers to abilities relevant to performing a task, while ‘competency’ is a legal judgment that one 
has sufficient abilities to perform the task.”). Yet, some medical aid in dying statutes in the United States use 
the term “capacity” in a manner that is analogous to “competence” above. Here, the findings of the clinical 
assessment performed by physicians and consulting mental health professionals determine patients’ eligibility 
to receive a lethal prescription and operate as “competence” determinations. The statutes delegate the authority 
to determine competence to the health care professionals who act pursuant to the statute’s authority. This 
transforms the findings of clinical assessments into, in effect, a legal determination, without court involvement. 
See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A GUIDE 
FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 11 (1998) (“Most authors distinguish between 
assessments of decisionmaking capacity, which health care professionals can conduct, and determination of 
competence, which are legal judgments left to the courts. Although technically correct, this distinction tends to 
break down in practice [in light of the practical consequences of clinician’s judgments of capacity].”). Grisso 
and Appelbaum indicate that they use the term “decision-making capacities” when referring to the abilities 
related to the decisions, but use “competence” “to denote the state in which patients’ decision-making capacities 
are sufficiently intact for their decisions to be honored . . . regardless of who makes that determination.” Id. 
Grisso and Appelbaum’s observation that the distinction between the terms breaks down in practice is apt in this 
context, particularly because clinicians’ determinations of capacity have the effect of legal judgments of 
competence. Id. 
 11. See infra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.  
 12. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5(a)(1)(A)(iii) (West 2020) 
(requiring referral for further capacity assessment to determine if the individual has the capacity to make medical 
decisions and “is not suffering from impaired judgment due to mental disorder”). 
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evaluation persons whom he or she believes “may not be capable.”13 In Hawaii, 
however, all persons requesting medical aid in dying must undergo an 
evaluation with a mental health professional for the purpose of assessing 
capacity, even when there are no manifestations of impaired judgment.14 In all 
states with medical aid in dying statutes, those patients whose judgment is 
determined to be impaired by the mental health specialist are ineligible to receive 
the requested prescription. 
Persons coping with the premature end to their lives as a result of a terminal 
illness typically experience some degree of psychological distress.15 Such 
distress may constitute relatively normal responses to challenging personal 
circumstances that should not be confused with mental disorders or related 
conditions.16 Yet, even when a dying person meets diagnostic criteria for a 
mental disorder, it does not necessarily follow that the individual’s capacity to 
make medical decisions is impaired. Modern legal principles categorically reject 
per se generalizations that persons who have mental disorders are not competent 
to make treatment decisions.17 Presumptions to the contrary are also inconsistent 
with the accumulated knowledge in the fields of psychology and psychiatry.18 
Even persons with more severe mental disorders, including depression requiring 
psychiatric hospitalization, typically satisfy legal standards of competence.19  
 
 13. N.J. STAT. ANN § 26:16-8 (West 2020). 
 14. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 15. Psychological distress has been conceptually defined as a “unique, discomforting, emotional state 
experienced by an individual in response to a specific stressor or demand that results in harm, either temporary, 
or permanent, to the person.” Brian Kelly et al., Measurement of Psychological Distress in Palliative Care, 20 
PALLIATIVE MED. 779, 779 (2006) (“The nature of the experience may be psychological (cognitive, behavior, 
emotion), social and/or spiritual, such that an individual’s ability to cope with the illness, its physical symptoms 
and treatment are effected.”). The terms “emotional distress,” “existential distress,” “psychological suffering” 
and “spiritual suffering” are also used in the palliative care literature to refer to the discomforting psychological 
experiences that may accompany the dying process. Harvey Max Chochinov, Dying, Dignity, and New Horizons 
in Palliative End-of-Life Care, 56 CA: A CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 84, 85–86 (2006).  
 16. The terms “mental disorder,” “psychological condition,” or “psychiatric condition,” which are used in 
one or more medical aid in dying statutes, can refer to “a syndrome characterized by clinically significant 
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotional regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the 
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 20 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] 
(defining mental disorder). These diagnostic terms contrast with the term “psychological distress.” See supra 
note 15. The latter term describes the experience of an uncomfortable emotional state, which does not necessarily 
cause disturbance in an individual’s functional abilities or processes. For a dying patient, the experience of 
psychological or existential distress is often an expression of “an expectable or culturally approved response to 
a common stressor or loss,” see DSM-V supra, and does not fall within the definition of a mental disorder. In 
other cases, a dying patient may also meet the criteria of a diagnosable mental disorder and the psychological 
distress may be part of a larger complex of symptoms. Distinguishing between the manifestations of grief 
frequently experienced by persons dying from terminal diseases and the symptoms of a depressive or other 
mental disorder can be challenging for health care professionals. See, e.g., Susan D. Block, Assessing and 
Managing Depression in the Terminally Ill Patient, 132 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 209 (2000); Eric W. Widera 
& Susan D. Block, Managing Grief and Depression at the End of Life, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN (Aug. 1, 2012), 
https://www.aafp.org/afp/2012/0801/p259.html.  
 17. See infra notes 141–143 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 143, 156–170 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 157–169 and accompanying text. 
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In order to ensure that patients requesting medical aid in dying are not 
subject to outdated presumptions of incapacity because of manifestations of 
psychological suffering or a diagnosis of a mental disorder, criterion-relevant 
assessments of patient capacity are necessary. That is, those assessments must 
be closely keyed to the applicable legal standards of capacity. None of the 
jurisdictions authorizing medical aid in dying rely solely on the diagnosis of a 
mental disorder or psychological/psychiatric condition to determine capacity. In 
Oregon, for example, two findings are required in order for a patient to be 
determined not competent: (1) the existence of the mental disorder or 
psychological/psychiatric condition and (2) evidence of “impaired judgment” 
caused by that mental disorder or condition.20 Yet, what is meant by “impaired 
judgment,” and what standards, procedures, and assessment measures should be 
used in evaluating patient decisionmaking capacity for the purpose of choosing 
medical aid in dying? Furthermore, how high should the threshold be that 
distinguishes those who are competent from those who are not?  
This Article addresses these questions. It examines concepts of 
decisionmaking capacity relevant to medical aid in dying as it is currently 
authorized in the United States. It analyzes pertinent statutory provisions within 
the context of concepts, assessment, and research related to treatment 
decisionmaking capacity, particularly as relevant to persons with psychological 
or psychiatric conditions. It recommends: (1) avoidance of any per se or status-
based conclusions that persons experiencing psychological distress or mental 
disorders are not competent to make their own treatment decisions; (2) use of 
criterion-relevant assessments of decisionmaking capacity that operationalize 
legal standards of competence; (3) the same threshold for determining capacity 
to decide regarding medical aid in dying as is employed to determine capacity 
for other health care decisions related to survival near the end of life; and (4) full 
disclosure of, and timely access to, appropriate psychological and psychiatric 
palliative care for patients who request medical aid in dying and are experiencing 
psychological distress or a mental disorder. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the history and current legal 
status of medical aid in dying in the United States and discusses the key 
provisions of the medical aid in dying laws in the ten U.S. jurisdictions that 
currently permit medical aid in dying. Part II discusses concepts of treatment 
decisionmaking capacity within the context of the law of informed consent, 
incorporating theoretical and scientific advancements of the past several 
decades. Part III analyzes the concept of capacity to decide about medical aid in 
dying. It analyzes the relevant statutory language in the jurisdictions that 
authorize medical aid in dying and examines scientific findings on the 
relationship between treatment decisionmaking capacity and mental disorders. 
Part III then synthesizes empirical work on the psychological status of persons 
requesting medical aid in dying and, more generally, persons at the end of life 
 
 20. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (2017). 
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due to a terminal illness. Part IV sets forth recommendations for medical aid in 
dying capacity evaluations. It addresses procedures, competence standards and 
measures, the appropriate threshold for determining competence, and 
recommended training and expertise for those who perform competence 
evaluations under the medical aid in dying statutes. Part V urges attending and 
consulting health care professionals tasked with evaluating, educating, or 
counseling persons under the statutes to inform patients who are experiencing 
psychological distress or a mental disorder about appropriate psychological or 
psychiatric palliative care services. It recommends further that health care 
facilities and institutions make such services readily available. 
This Article endorses the predominant model of treatment decisionmaking 
capacity supported by the scientific literature. It further recommends that the 
threshold for determining capacity be no higher in the context of medical aid in 
dying than for other end of life health care decisions relating to survival. The 
juxtaposition of these recommendations, together with a serious commitment to 
offering and providing appropriate mental health treatment to dying patients 
interested in such services, strikes a balance between legal and ethical principles 
of autonomy and beneficence.21 It supports the agency of persons who meet 
relevant legal standards of capacity and are otherwise eligible under the medical 
aid in dying statutes, authorizing them to make important choices regarding the 
manner and timing of their deaths. It also offers those persons voluntary access 
to interventions that may provide them with relief from their distress and 
symptoms. Such relief may lead a patient who is eligible to receive medical aid 
in dying to delay or, in some cases, forego medical aid in dying. At the same 
time, providing patients with knowledge of and voluntary access to appropriate 
psychological and psychiatric palliative care helps ensure that those who choose 
to go forward with medical aid in dying do so with complete understanding of 
alternatives that might mitigate their psychological distress.  
I.  MEDICAL AID IN DYING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. MEDICAL AID IN DYING: THE STATE OF AMERICAN LAW 
At the time of this writing, ten jurisdictions in the United States allow 
eligible patients suffering from a terminal illness to receive a physician-
prescribed lethal medication so that they can control the manner and timing of 
their deaths. Oregon’s pathbreaking statute was the first of its type, passed in 
1994, and implemented in 1997.22 In 2008, Washington adopted a statute 
 
 21. See infra notes 62–66, 274–277, 315 and accompanying text. 
 22.  Passed by voter initiative in 1994, the implementation of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 127.800–897 (2017) was delayed by injunction during the pendency of litigation challenging its 
constitutionality. Lee v. State, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied Lee v. Harcleroad, 522 U.S. 927 
(1997). The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs (physicians, treatment facilities, and terminally ill patients) did 
not have standing to pursue these federal Constitutional claims. Lee, 107 F.3d at 1390–92.  The injunction was 
lifted on Oct. 27, 1997, after the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1997 in the federal lawsuit. Lee, 522 
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patterned after Oregon’s model,23 followed by Vermont in 2013,24 California in 
2015,25 Colorado in 2016,26 the District of Columbia in 2016,27 Hawaii in 
2017,28 and New Jersey and Maine in 2019.29  
In 2009, the Montana Supreme Court legalized medical aid in dying when 
holding that provision of physician aid in dying in response to certain categories 
of patient requests does not fall within the purview of the state’s criminal 
proscription of assisting a suicide.30 To date, Montana is the only state in which 
 
U.S. at 927. A ballot measure seeking repeal of the Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act was placed on the ballot 
that November. Hamilton v. Myers, 943 P.2d 214, 220 (Or. 1997). The measure was defeated by a margin of 
sixty percent to forty percent. Death with Dignity Act, OR. HEALTH AUTH., https://www.oregon.gov/ 
oha/ph/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/deathwithdignityact/pages/faqs.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 
2020). In 2001, United States Attorney General John Ashcroft “issued an Interpretive Rule announcing his intent 
to restrict the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide.” Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 
254 (2006). This Interpretive Rule concluded that use of controlled substances did not constitute a “legitimate 
medical purpose” as required under the Controlled Substances Act, and therefore was in violation of federal law. 
Id. at 255. Under this interpretation, physicians who prescribed these drugs pursuant to the Oregon statute 
jeopardized their medical licenses. Various parties sued to enjoin enforcement of the Interpretive Rule and 
prevailed in 2006 when the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Interpretive Rule was inconsistent with 
Congressional intent and that the Attorney General had exceeded his authority in rendering this interpretation. 
Id. at 254, 268. 
 23. Washington’s statute was passed by initiative in 2008 and became effective on March 5, 2009.  
Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245 et seq. (2019). 
 24. In 2013, the Vermont General Assembly passed Act 39, Patient Choice and Control at the End of Life 
Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–93 (2019). The statute became effective May 20, 2013.   
 25. The California legislature passed the End of Life Option Act in 2015. The statute became effective 
June 9, 2016. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2020). 
 26. The Colorado End-of-Life Options Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-48-101–23 (2020), was adopted by 
the voters in 2016. It became effective on December 16, 2016.   
 27. The District of Columbia’s Death with Dignity Act of 2016, D.C. LAW 21-182, was adopted by the 
Council of the District of Columbia and signed by the Mayor of the District of Columbia in 2016, with an 
effective date of February 18, 2017. The law has faced some opposition within Congress, however. Congress  
has appropriations powers affecting the District of Columbia budget, and has authority to review and overturn 
laws passed by the District of Columbia Council. For a summary of Congressional efforts, see, for example, 
Rachel Sadon, House Committee Revives Fight Against D.C.’s Death with Dignity Law, DCIST (July 14, 2017, 
4:04 PM), https://dcist.com/story/17/07/14/house-committee-death-with-dignity/. Thus far, Congressional 
opponents of aid in dying have been unsuccessful in mounting sufficient support within Congress for their efforts 
to interfere with the District of Columbia’s law. For a discussion of Congressional authority over local 
lawmaking in the District of Columbia, see, for example, Mary M. Cheh, Theories of Representation: For the 
District of Columbia, Only Statehood Will Do, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 65, 78 (2014). The District of 
Columbia has also faced challenges in making aid in dying available because few medical professionals have 
chosen to participate. Fenit Nirappil, A Year After D.C. Passed Its Controversial Assisted Suicide Law, Not a 
Single Patient Has Used It, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018, 10:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-
politics/a-year-after-dc-passed-its-assisted-suicide-law-only-two-doctors-have-signed-
up/2018/04/10/823cf7e2-39ca-11e8-9c0a-85d477d9a226_story.html?utm_term=.f0a72174ac9a. 
 28. The Hawaii Legislature passed the Our Care, Our Choice Act in 2018. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-1 
(2019). The law became effective January 1, 2019.  
 29. The New Jersey legislature passed the Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act in 2019, 
effective August 1, 2019. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 26:16-1 et seq. (2019). The Maine legislature passed the Maine 
Death with Dignity Act in 2019. ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 2140 (2019). The governor signed the legislation on June 
12, 2019, and it became effective September 19, 2019.  
 30. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Montana held in Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009), that a 
terminally ill patient’s consent to medical aid in dying constitutes a statutory defense to a charge of homicide 
under the Montana’s criminal statutes. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (2019) (setting forth statutory consent 
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litigation to modify criminal prohibitions in medical aid in dying has been 
successful.31 One famous challenge to a state statute prohibiting medical aid in 
dying culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 1997 in Washington 
v. Glucksberg.32 The Court held that Washington’s statutes criminalizing 
assisted suicide did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The plaintiffs challenging the Washington statute asserted “the 
existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
encompassing the “personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill 
adult” to receive physician assistance to hasten death.33 Declining to apply 
heightened scrutiny, the Court found Washington’s statute to be rationally 
related to legitimate government interests in preserving human life, discouraging 
suicide, protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, and 
shielding vulnerable groups from “abuse, neglect, and mistakes.”34 In a 
companion case, Vacco v. Quill, the Court upheld the constitutionality of New 
York’s prohibition on assisted suicide on Equal Protection grounds.35 These 
cases effectively foreclosed subsequent challenges to state restrictions on federal 
constitutional grounds. Litigants in some states have argued, albeit also 
unsuccessfully, that the bans violate state constitutional provisions, or that 
proper construction of the statutes excludes application to medical aid in dying.36  
 
defense). The court held that medical aid in dying is not against public policy and thus the consent defense statute 
shielded physicians from homicide liability for assistance given to terminally ill patients through provision of a 
prescription for a lethal dose of medication to be self-administered by the patient. Baxter, 224 P.2d at 1215–16. 
The Montana Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether a patient has a constitutional right to die 
under MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 10, despite the extensive briefing of the issues by the parties.  Following the 
Baxter decision, Montana legislators have made multiple unsuccessful attempts to pass statutes that would create 
a regulatory structure governing the practice. See S.B. 202, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (Mont. 2015); S.B. 220, 2013 
Leg., 63d Sess. (Mont. 2013); S.B. 167, 2011 Leg., 62d Sess. (Mont. 2011). Other legislators have introduced 
bills to criminalize the practice, and these have not passed either. See S.B. 116, 2011 Leg., 62d Sess. (Mont. 
2011). As of February 15, 2019, a bill that would criminalize medical aid in dying in Montana has passed the 
House and awaited action by the relevant Senate committee, although such action has not been forthcoming. See 
Doctor Imprisonment Bill, H.B. 284, 2019 Leg., 66th Sess. (Mont. 2019). Because no legislation has passed 
regulating medical aid in dying in Montana, as contrasted with the other nine jurisdictions, the practice is not 
governed by statutory standards or procedures, and no state-mandated data collection or record-keeping reveals 
how the law has been implemented. Indeed, most information about the practice of medical aid in dying in 
Montana is anecdotal, available primarily through communications by and with advocacy organizations or 
individual physicians. See, e.g., COMPASSION IN CHOICES, MT., FIVE YEARS OF DIGNITY: THE BAXTER RULING 
AND END-OF-LIFE FREEDOM IN MONTANA (2014), http://compassionandchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
10/Five-Years-of-Dignity.pdf. 
 31. See, e.g., Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001); Kligler v. Healy, No. SUCV201603254F, 2017 
WL 2803074 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2017); State v. Final Exit Network, 889 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016); 
State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d (Minn. 2014); Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016); Myers 
v. Schneiderman, 85 N.E.3d 57 (N.Y. 2017); see also Kathryn L. Tucker, A Nadir of State Constitutional 
Jurisprudence: Failing to Protect Terminally Ill Patients’ Choice for a More Peaceful Death in New Mexico, 48 
N.M. L. REV. 315 (2018) (analyzing the decision in Morris). 
 32. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
 33. Id. at 708. 
 34. Id. at 728–35. 
 35. 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 36. For a summary of state litigation, see Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal History of Medical Aid in Dying: 
Physician Assisted Death in the U.S. Courts and Legislatures, 48 N.M. L. REV. 267, 287–99 (2018). 
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Legal reform, therefore, has been effectuated primarily by legislative 
action, or as occurred in Oregon, voter initiative. And, indeed, as the Court noted 
at the end of its Glucksberg opinion, its “holding permit[ted] this debate [about 
medical aid in dying] to continue” through democratic action.37 In her 
concurrence, Justice O’Connor observed:  
There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper 
balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent 
individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the State’s interests in 
protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure. As 
the Court recognizes, States are presently undertaking extensive and serious 
evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and other related issues. In such 
circumstances, “the . . . challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures 
for safeguarding . . . liberty interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the 
States . . . in the first instance.”38  
Although eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted the policy 
legislatively, other jurisdictions have thus far failed to pass medical aid in dying 
statutes.39 At the time of this writing, bills that would authorize medical aid in 
dying are under consideration in several state legislatures.40 While there is no 
way to predict the future pace of state legislative action, the pace may be picking 
 
 37. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
 38. Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 
497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Kathryn Tucker, who represented plaintiffs in Glucksberg, 
observed in 2008 that Oregon’s Death with Dignity statute had been in force for a decade, with no evidence of 
the deleterious consequences cited by the Court. Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States: The 
Progress of Glucksberg’s Invitation to the States to Address End-of-Life Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593 (2008). 
The success of Oregon’s experiment, she urged, should encourage other states to pursue a similar path. Id. at 
1596. Although the pace was initially slow, other states have followed suit. And as the analysis of key statutory 
provisions in this Article observes, most states have remained strikingly close to Oregon’s model.  
 39. For example, in New Mexico, medical aid in dying bills were proposed 1995, 2009, 2017, and 2019: 
S.B. 446, 42d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1995); H.B. 814, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009); H.B. 171, 53d Leg.. 1st 
Sess. (N.M. 2017); S.B. 252, 53d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2017);  H.B. 90, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019); S.B. 
153, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019). The New York legislature considered medical aid in dying bills in four 
sessions between 1995 and 2012. S.B. 1683, 1995–1996 Leg. (N.Y. 1995); S.B. 5024-A, 1995–1996 Leg. (N.Y. 
1995); A.B. 6333, 1995–1996 Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 1995); S.B. 4834, 1999–2000 Leg. (N.Y. 1999); S.B. 677, 
2001–2002 Leg. (N.Y. 2001); A.B. 9360, 2012–2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2012). And in every year from 2015 
until the present session, except 2018, the New York legislature has considered similar bills: S.B. 3685, 2015–
2016 Leg. (N.Y. 2015), and companion bill A.B. 02129, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2015); S.B. 5814-A, 
2015–2016 Leg. (N.Y. 2015), and companion bill A.B. 5261-C, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2015); S.B. 
7579, 2016–2017 Leg. (N.Y. 2016), and companion bill A.B. 10059, 2016–2017 Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2016); 
S.B. 3151-A, 2017–2018 Leg. (N.Y. 2017), and companion bill A 2383-A, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 
2017); S.B. 2045, 2017–2018 Leg. (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 3947, 2019–2020 Leg. (N.Y. 2019), and companion bill 
A.B. 2694, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2019). 
 40. See, e.g., Arizona: H.B. 2408, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2019), H.B. 2512, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 
2019), and S.B. 1193, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2019) (proposing addition of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3301 
et seq. (2020)); Connecticut (H.B. 5898, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2019)); Indiana (H.B. 1184, 121st Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2019) and S.B. 300, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2019) (proposing addition of 
IND. CODE § 16-18-2-326.8 (2020)); Massachusetts (S.B. 1208, 191st Leg. (Mass. 2019) and H.B. 1926, 191st 
Leg. (Mass. 2019) (proposing addition of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201G, § 1 et seq. (2020)); and New Jersey (A.B. 
1504, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018) and S.B. 1072, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018). 
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up, in that there has been an increase in successful legislative action in the last 
four years.  
There have been significant developments in medical aid in dying in 
Canada. In 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Carter v. Canada, struck 
down Canada’s restrictions on physician assistance in dying as an 
unconstitutional violation of the rights of life, liberty, and security guaranteed 
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.41 The holding was limited to 
consenting, competent adults experiencing a “grievous and irremediable medical 
condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring 
suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her 
condition.”42 The Parliament subsequently enacted a Medical Aid in Dying 
statute,43 consistent with the mandates of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
opinion. Some provisions of that statute will be discussed below.44  
B. MEDICAL AID IN DYING STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES 
The statutes in the jurisdictions that have adopted medical aid in dying have 
in common certain basic restrictions on the availability of this end of life choice. 
The important substantive criteria are virtually identical across these states. In 
order to be eligible for physician assistance under the statutes, patients must be 
diagnosed as having a terminal disease, meaning “an incurable and irreversible 
disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical 
judgment, produce death within six months.”45  
Patients who request medical aid in dying must demonstrate present 
capacity to make treatment decisions,46 and their requests must be voluntary.47 
Furthermore, the statutes do not permit patients to authorize a proxy 
decisionmaker to choose medical aid in dying on that patient’s behalf at some 
future time.48 Thus, patients may not choose medical aid in dying by means of 
advanced directives or powers of attorney.49 This restriction effectively 
 
 41. Carter v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R 331, 334 (Can.). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical 
Assistance in Dying), S.C. 2016, c 3 (Can.).   
 44. See infra notes 49, 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 45. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (12) (2017); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(q) (West 2020) 
(“[A terminal illness] means an incurable and irreversible disease . . . that will, within reasonable medical 
judgment, result in death within six months.”). 
 46. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 47. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.2(a)(2); 443.3(b)(3)(B)–(C); 443.5(a)(1)(C); 
443.5(a)(4); 443.8(b). 
 48. For example, in California, the statute specifies that the request for medical aid in dying medication 
“shall be made solely and directly by the individual diagnosed with the terminal disease and shall not be made 
on behalf of the patient, including, but not limited to, through a power of attorney, an advance health care 
directive, a conservator, health care agent, surrogate, or any other legally recognized health care decisionmaker.” 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2(c). 
 49. The question of whether patients should be permitted to exercise medical aid in dying with advanced 
directives is undergoing serious debate in Canada. One of the provisions of the statute authorizing medical aid 
in dying in Canada required the Ministers of Justice Health in Canada to initiate an independent review of issues 
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precludes access to medical aid in dying persons whose medical condition leads 
to incompetence to make health care decisions prior to the statutory six-month 
life-expectancy window. The statutes also require that patients be physically 
capable of self-administering the lethal dose of prescribed medication.50 This 
requirement effectively precludes access to medical aid in dying for persons who 
have lost physical capacity to self-administer the medication prior to the 
statutory six-month life-expectancy window.  
Patients who wish to avail themselves of medical aid in dying must request 
assistance from a physician licensed to practice medicine in that jurisdiction.51 
The statutes also contain carefully delineated procedures that incorporate a 
myriad of safeguards.52 In addition, in the United States, mental disorders cannot 
serve as qualifying conditions under the statutes because they are not terminal 
 
relating to “advance requests” for medical aid in dying “no later than 180 days after the day” on which the statute 
was enacted. See S.C. 2016, c 3, § 9.1(1) (Can.). The identified ministries referred the issue to the Council of 
Canadian Academies, which has published a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the background and issues 
related to authorization of medical aid in dying through advanced directives. See COUNCIL OF CANADIAN 
ACADEMIES, THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON ADVANCE REQUESTS FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING (2018), 
https://cca-reports.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/The-State-of-Knowledge-on-Advance-Requests-for-
Medical-Assistance-in-Dying.pdf. The Canadian statute also requires the identified ministries to refer two other 
issues for study: whether mature minors should be permitted to consent to medical assistance in dying, and 
whether “requests where mental illness is the sole underlying medical condition” should be authorized under the 
statute. See S.C. 2016, c 3, § 9.1(1) (Can.). The Council of Canadian Academies has published detailed reports 
analyzing these issues as well. See COUNCIL OF CANADIAN ACADEMIES, THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING FOR MATURE MINORS (2018), https://cca-reports.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/The-State-of-Knowledge-on-Medical-Assistance-in-Dying-for-Mature-Minors.pdf; 
COUNCIL OF CANADIAN ACADEMIES, THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING WHERE A 
MENTAL DISORDER IS THE SOLE UNDERLYING MEDICAL CONDITION (2018), https://cca-reports.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/The-State-of-Knowledge-on-Medical-Assistance-in-Dying-Where-a-Mental-
Disorder-is-the-Sole-Underlying-Medical-Condition.pdf (hereinafter WHERE MENTAL DISORDER IS THE SOLE 
UNDERLYING MEDICAL CONDITION). 
 50. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443(a)(3)(5). 
 51. Physicians’ participation in the medical aid in dying process is voluntary in all ten U.S. jurisdictions, 
as is the participation of health care organizations. The statutes provide for immunities that protect practitioners 
from any negative consequences for decisions to participate or not in the provision of medical aid in dying. See, 
e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885 (2017). If, however, a health care organization chooses not to participate, those 
practitioners working within that setting cannot provide the service under the auspices of that organization.   
 52. For example, the statutes require that a “consulting physician” meet with the requesting patient and 
review records, confirm all of the medical findings, and the attending physician’s findings regarding capacity 
and voluntariness prior to the determination of the patient’s eligibility. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(4) 
(2017) (“‘Consulting physician’ means a physician who is qualified by specialty or experience to make a 
professional diagnosis and prognosis regarding the patient’s disease.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (“The 
attending physician shall . . . [r]efer the patient to a consulting physician for medical confirmation of the 
diagnosis, and for a determination that the patient is capable and acting voluntarily[.]”). The consulting physician 
can independently initiate the referral to the mental health professional for a capacity evaluation if he or she has 
concerns regarding impaired judgment. The statutes have other procedural protections, such as requirements for 
witnesses. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT § 127.810 (“[A]t least two individuals who . . . attest that to the best of their 
knowledge and belief the patient is capable, acting voluntarily, and is not being coerced to sign the request.”). 
The statutes also have protections such as waiting periods. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.840, 127.850 (“A 
qualified patient shall have made an oral request and a written request, and reiterate the oral request to his or her 
attending physician no less than fifteen (15) days after making the initial oral request.”).  
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diseases under the definition, which appears to require that the natural course of 
the patient’s disease be such that it leads to death.53  
C. WHAT THIS ARTICLE IS NOT ABOUT 
This Article does not address the question of whether the jurisdictions that 
authorize medical aid in dying in the United States should modify their 
provisions so that mental disorders can serve as qualifying conditions. As noted 
above, mental disorders cannot serve as qualifying conditions under the medical 
aid in dying statutes in the United States because such disorders are not terminal 
diseases that limit life expectancy to six months or less due to the natural 
progress of the conditions.54 Scholars, and to a lesser extent, lawmakers, are 
debating the implications of allowing mental disorders to serve as qualifying 
conditions for medical aid in dying.55 That debate is particularly lively in 
Canada.56 Unlike in the United States, medical aid in dying in Canada is not 
restricted to persons who are not expected to survive beyond six months. The 
Canadian statute, adopted on June 17, 2016, requires a finding that a person is 
living with a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” by meeting all of 
the following criteria:  
 
 53. Although there is evidence that persons with mental disorders have higher risk of mortality than persons 
without mental disorders, see Premature Death Among People with Severe Mental Disorders, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., https://www.who.int/mental_health/management/info_sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2020); Elizabeth 
Reisinger Walker et al., Mortality in Mental Disorders and Global Disease Burden Implications: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 334 (2015), the disorders do not “produce” or “result in” 
death directly, as appears to be required under the U.S. medical aid in dying statutes. Due to a range of factors, 
such as poor access to preventive and treatment services for comorbid physical illnesses, and greater exposure 
to risk factors, persons with serious mental disorders are viewed as more vulnerable to threats to their physical 
health than are persons the general population. World Health Organization, supra; Shekhar Saxena, Excess 
Mortality Among People with Mental Disorders: A Public Health Priority, 3 LANCET PUB. HEALTH e264 (2018).  
The higher mortality of persons with mental disorders is due to a combination of greater susceptibility to disease 
and chronic conditions, a higher frequency of accidents and death by suicide, and other factors. Premature 
Death, supra; Walker et al., supra.  
 54. See supra notes 45, 53 and accompanying text. 
 55. For excellent overviews of the issues, see Candice T. Player, Death with Dignity and Mental Disorder, 
60 ARIZ. L. REV. 115, 123–27 (2018); Catherine S. Shaffer et al., A Conceptual Framework for Thinking about 
Physician-Assisted Death for Persons with a Mental Disorder, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 141, 142–43, 143 
tbl.1 (2016). For contrasting viewpoints, compare Paul S. Appelbaum, Should Mental Disorders Be a Basis for 
Physician-Assisted Death?, 68 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 315, 315–317 (2017), and Thomas Blikshavn et al., Four 
Reasons Why Assisted Dying Should Not Be Offered for Depression, 14 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 151, 151–56 
(2016), and Scott Y.H. Kim & Trudo Lemmens, Should Assisted Dying for Psychiatric Disorders Be Legalized 
in Canada? 188 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. E337, E337–38 (2016), and Franklin G. Miller & Paul S. Appelbaum, 
Physician-Assisted Death for Psychiatric Patients—Misguided Public Policy, 378 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 883, 
883–85 (2018), with Justine Dembo et al., “For Their Own Good”: A Response to Popular Arguments Against 
Permitting Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) Where Mental Illness Is the Sole Underlying Condition, 63 
CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 451, 452–54 (2018), and Player, supra, and William Rooney et al., Are Concerns 
About Irremediableness, Vulnerability, or Competence Sufficient to Justify Excluding All Psychiatric Patients 
from Medical Aid in Dying?, 26 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 326, 327–41 (2018). 
 56. See, e.g., WHERE MENTAL DISORDER IS THE SOLE UNDERLYING MEDICAL CONDITION, supra note 49, 
at 61–107, 148–89, https://cca-reports.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/The-State-of-Knowledge-on-Medical-
Assistance-in-Dying-Where-a-Mental-Disorder-is-the-Sole-Underlying-Medical-Condition.pdf. 
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(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; (b) they 
are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; (c) that illness, 
disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical or 
psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved 
under conditions that they consider acceptable; and (d) their natural death has 
become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical 
circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the 
specific length of time that they have remaining.57  
As instructed by the Canadian Parliament, the Ministers of Justice and 
Health in Canada commissioned independent reviews of several questions, 
including whether medical aid in dying requests “where mental illness is the sole 
underlying medical condition” should be permissible in Canada.58 The report of 
the task force assembled to review this question published its report in December 
2018.59 Broadening of the statute to include mental disorders as qualifying 
conditions under some circumstances would require revision of Section (d) 
above, and certain other provisions.60 Presently, a mental disorder can serve as 
the qualifying condition in certain European countries, such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands.61  
 
 57. S.C. 2016, c 3, § 241.2(2) (Can.) 
 58. Id. at § 9.1. 
 59. WHERE MENTAL DISORDER IS THE SOLE UNDERLYING MEDICAL CONDITION, supra note 49. The 
Working Group did not make a recommendation in favor of or in opposition to the availability of medical aid in 
dying to persons who wish to access this intervention when identifying a mental disorder as the sole qualifying 
condition. Id. It highlighted questions relevant to the charge, surveyed pertinent scientific work, and addressed 
potential implications of expansion of availability to persons under these circumstances. Id. In May 2019, eight 
members of that Working Group, referring to themselves as the “Halifax Group,” reassembled and drafted a 
second report under the auspices of the non-profit Institute for Public Policy Research in Canada. HALIFAX 
GROUP, MAID LEGISLATION AT THE CROSSROADS: PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS AS THEIR SOLE 
UNDERLYING MEDICAL CONDITION (2020), https://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/MAiD-Legislation-at-
a-Crossroads-Persons-with-Mental-Disorders-as-Their-Sole-Underlying-Medical-Condition.pdf [hereinafter 
MAID LEGISLATION AT THE CROSSROADS]. The Halifax Group recommended that persons seeking medical aid 
in dying based on a mental disorder as a sole underlying condition should not be categorically excluded from 
access. Id. at 25.  
 60. Indeed, “the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ natural death and ‘end of life’ eligibility criteria were challenged 
by Jean Truchon and Nicole Gladu—two individuals seeking access to [medical aid in dying] but whose natural 
deaths were not yet reasonably foreseeable and who were not at the end of life.” MAID LEGISLATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 59, at 4. Truchon and Gladu’s challenge to the statute were successful.  In September 
2019, a Quebec Superior Court struck down the challenged provisions. Truchon v. Attorney General Canada, 
2019 CanLII 3792 (Can. Q.B. S.C.), https://www.canlii.org/en/qc/qccs/doc/2019/2019qccs3792/ 
2019qccs3792.pdf. Although the plaintiffs did not cite mental disorders as the conditions they urged should 
qualify them for access to medical aid in dying, the decision opens the door to the potential application of the 
statute to persons who identify mental disorders as their sole qualifying conditions. The decision, which becomes 
effective in March 2020, is binding authority only in the province of Quebec. See MAID LEGISLATION AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note 59, at 4. At the time of this writing, the government of Quebec is seeking input from 
the public and the medical community in determining whether to draft an exception to the application of the 
Truchon decision that would exclude mental disorders as sole qualifying conditions. See Kalina LaFramboise, 
Quebec Backtracks on Expanding Medical Aid in Dying to People with Mental Illness, GLOBAL NEWS (Jan. 27, 
2020), available at https://globalnews.ca/news/6466641/quebec-assisted-dying-mentally-ill-backtrack/. 
 61. For a discussion of these and other nations’ laws allowing medical aid in dying where a mental disorder 
is the sole qualifying condition, see, for example Player, supra note 55, at 123–27; Shaffer et al., supra note 55, 
at 143, 143 tbl.1. For more extensive analysis, see, for example, Joris Vandenberghe, Euthanasia in Patients 
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Notwithstanding the distinctions between the topic that is the focus of this 
Article and the question of whether a patient should have access to medical aid 
in dying when the sole qualifying or underlying condition is a mental disorder, 
some of the sources addressing the latter issue are cited within for propositions 
that relate more narrowly to decisionmaking capacity and mental disorder.  
II.  TREATMENT OF DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY: THE LAW AND THE SCIENCE 
A. THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
The doctrine of informed consent incorporates concepts, standards, rules, 
and practices governing the exercise of an individual’s legal authority to make 
decisions about his or her own health care. According to legal and ethical 
principles, a patient’s health care decisions must be informed, competent, and 
voluntary in order to be legally valid.62 A core value underlying and justifying 
the doctrine of informed consent is the principle of autonomy.63 In the context 
of health care decisionmaking, respect for autonomy highlights our social 
valuing of personal choice, self-direction, and “self-rule that is free from both 
controlling interferences by others and . . . limitations such as inadequate 
understanding that prevents meaningful choice.”64 It recognizes that basic rights 
of bodily integrity are violated if medical tests, procedures, or interventions 
affecting one’s body or mind proceed without consent.65 No statement better 
captures the notion of autonomy in health care decisionmaking than the famous 
and frequently-quoted proclamation of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for 
 
with Intolerable Suffering Due to an Irremediable Psychiatric Illness: A Psychiatric Perspective, in 
EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE: LESSONS FROM BELGIUM 150 (David Albert Jones et al. eds., 2017); see 
also ROBERT POOL, NEGOTIATING A GOOD DEATH: EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS (2000).  
 62. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 7–11; Meisel et al., supra note 9, at 286–87. 
 63. For a review of commentary addressing the role of autonomy as the foundation of the doctrine of 
informed consent, see Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 55, 58–61 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010); see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES 
F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 101, 121 (7th ed. 2012); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 108–12 (1988); WILLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF 
AUTONOMY: COERCION AND CONSTRAINTS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 28–29 (2003); Bruce Jennings, Autonomy, IN 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS 72, 77–78 (Bonnie Steinbock ed., 2009).  
 64. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 101; see also The Belmont Report, NAT’L COMM’N FOR 
PROTECT. HUM. SUBJECTS BIOMED. & BEHAV. RES. (Apr. 18, 1979), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/ 
files/the-belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf (“To respect autonomy is to give weight to autonomous persons’ 
considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their actions unless they are clearly 
detrimental to others.”). For further discussion of a range of formulations of the concept of autonomy, see, for 
example, BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 61–65; DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 3–61; GAYLIN & 
JENNINGS, supra note 63, at 27–46. For a provocative challenge to the dominant role that traditional notions of 
autonomy play in end-of-life health care decisionmaking, see Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The 
Case for Relational Nudges in End-of-Life Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062 (2018).  
 65. See, e.g., BERG et al., supra note 9, at 11. See DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 112–13. Gerald Dworkin 
asserts that autonomy plays a special role in the context of health care decisionmaking. He notes that decisions 
about one’s health, such as “what form of treatment to undergo, the probabilities of cure and of side effects, 
judgments about how the body will look to others after various forms of surgery, whether to spend one’s last 
days in a hospital or at home – these are not technical, medical judgments.” Id. at 113. 
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New York’s highest court in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital: 
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body[.]”66  
Over the past decades, the law of informed consent has been shaped by 
sources and events in the field of bioethics (including scholarly analyses,67 
documents produced by numerous ethics commissions,68 formal codes of 
ethics,69 ethical analyses or opinions by professional organizations),70 tort law 
principles governing health care practitioner liability,71 constitutional law 
relevant to specific health care decisions,72 and specialized statutes and 
regulations governing informed consent in particular contexts.73  
 
 66. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). In this case, the court determined 
that a physician could be liable for complications of a surgical procedure to which the patient did not consent. 
While cases such as Schloendorff adjudicate tort liability of medical practitioners or institutions, they also 
articulate a common law principle of autonomy in the context of medical procedures, contributing to the 
development of the modern doctrine of informed consent. 
 67. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 101–49 (providing one of the earliest analyses 
of bioethical issues relevant to health care decisionmaking in its first edition); BERG et al., supra note 9, at 11; 
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (providing an 
overview and theoretical, historical, doctrinal, and empirical analysis of the concept of informed consent in 
ethics, law, and clinical practice from the time of Hippocrates to the date of publication); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT 
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 171–72, 205 (1986) (providing an early critical analysis of the doctrine of 
informed consent and the gap between ethical ideals and clinical practice). 
 68. 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 15–51 (1982) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S 
COMM’N]; The Belmont Report, supra note 64. 
 69. See, e.g., NUREMBERG CODE, reprinted in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 181, 181–82 (1949) (articulating the requirements for 
permissible medical experiments); Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/ethics/code/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).  
 70. See, e.g., Informed Consent: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, 
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 71. See, e.g., Jaime S. King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared 
Medical Decision-Making, 32 J.L. & MED. 429, 438–40 (2006). 
 72. The federal and state constitutional implications of informed consent doctrine have arisen in cases 
concerning rights to refuse unwanted treatment and to access to specific treatment interventions. For example, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that adults have a Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse lifesaving 
interventions, see, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), and forcible administration 
of psychotropic mediations, see, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–24 (1990). The Court has held 
that certain state statutory provisions violated individuals’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to access 
contraception, see, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453 (1971); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965), or abortion, see, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). State 
court holdings have, at times, supplemented federal decisions, grounding protections in state constitutional 
provisions. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 158-60 (Cal. 2001) (citing state constitutional 
protection of autonomy in health care decisionmaking). 
 73. For example, most states have passed statutes governing end-of-life decisionmaking, including 
provisions for advanced directives and surrogate decisionmaking. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 22-8A-4 (2019); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-504 (2019). States have also passed specialized statutes regulating consent for 
interventions such as surgical sterilization, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25.5-10-231–35; VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 54.1-2974–80 (2019), and breast cancer surgery, see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 109275 
(West 2020); FLA. STAT. § 458.324 (2019); see also federal regulations governing human participation in 
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Scholarship and policy analyses examining the doctrine of informed 
consent frequently identify the following as fundamental goals: (1) protecting 
patients’ interests in personally choosing whether to accept or reject health care 
treatments, procedures, diagnostic tests, and related interventions and (2) 
facilitating meaningful exercise of autonomy interests by providing patients with 
the information essential to making knowledgeable and well-reasoned 
decisions.74 In order to achieve its promise of promoting autonomy in patients’ 
health care decisions, the doctrine must concern itself with satisfaction of a range 
of requirements.75 The requirement that consent be informed mandates that 
health care practitioners disclose to prospective patients, in a comprehensible 
manner, the information necessary to make the treatment decision. That 
information should describe, consistent with the best available knowledge: (1) 
the nature of the condition, illness, disorder, or symptoms for which treatment is 
recommended; (2) the likely consequences of failure to treat the condition, 
illness, disorder, or symptoms; (3) the nature of the proposed or recommended 
treatment, and of alternative treatments; and (4) the possible benefits, risks, 
discomforts, and side effects of each identified treatment and its alternatives, as 
well as their anticipated likelihood.76  
The competence requirement underscores that patients must have the 
capacity to understand and reason about the information provided. Below, I 
review modern competence constructs and their articulation in U.S. medical aid 
in dying statutes.77 Finally, the doctrine of informed consent also requires that 
patients’ decisions regarding treatment be made voluntarily, that is, at a 
minimum, free from coercive or controlling influences.78  
B. THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND SCIENCE OF EVALUATING CAPACITY TO 
MAKE TREATMENT DECISIONS 
Competence to make treatment decisions—one of the three requirements 
for legally and ethically valid informed consent by a patient—first received 
 
research, Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2019), which also include specific informed 
consent requirements. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.  
 74. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra note 68, at 15–51; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra 
note 63, at 114–125; BERG et al., supra note 9, at 3–74; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 67, at 23–43; KATZ, 
supra note 69, at 38–74. 
 75. King & Moulton, supra note 71, at 463–80; see infra notes 76–101 and accompanying text.  
 76. This summary consolidates themes drawn from multiple sources. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, 
supra note 63, at 124–25; Informed Consent: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, supra note 70 (“[The 
physician should inform the patient of] 1. The diagnosis (when known)[,] 2. The nature and purpose of 
recommended interventions[,] 3. The burdens, risks, and expected benefits of all options, including foregoing 
treatment.”); Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between 
Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 413, 421; Meisel et al., supra note 9, at 286–
87; Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 
41 U. PITT  L. REV. 407, 421–37 (1980). 
 77. See infra notes 79–82, 95–122 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A Conceptual Model, 39 
HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 30, 32 (2009); Nelson et al., supra note 8, at 6. 
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attention in law and bioethics, and from the health and mental health professions, 
during the 1970s.79 California, for example, provides the following definition of 
health care decisionmaking capacity. “‘Capacity’ means a person’s ability to 
understand the nature and consequences of a decision and to make and 
communicate a decision, and includes in the case of proposed health care, the 
ability to understand its significant benefits, risks, and alternatives.”80 An 
interdisciplinary group of scholars supported by the MacArthur Foundation 
identified four standards of competence81: (1) ability to communicate a choice, 
(that is, ability to “clearly indicate [a] preferred treatment option”); (2) ability to 
understand relevant information (that is, to “grasp the fundamental meaning of 
information communicated by” the practitioner); (3) ability to reason about 
treatment options (that is, to “engage in a process of rational manipulate[ion of] 
the relevant information”); and (4) ability to appreciate the situation and its 
likely consequences (that is, to “acknowledge medical condition and likely 
consequences of treatment options,” particularly as applied to their own 
situation).82  
The theoretical and empirical work of the MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study team further advanced our conceptualizations of, and ability 
to evaluate, patients’ capacity to make legally valid treatment decisions.83 This 
work had been initiated a decade earlier by a first generation of treatment 
decisionmaking capacity scholars and researchers, at the University of 
Pittsburgh, Alan Meisel, Loren Roth, and Charles Lidz.84 Indeed, the University 
 
 79. Two of the most influential early papers on the topic, providing initial conceptualizations that 
influenced subsequent initiatives. See Meisel et al., supra note 9; Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to 
Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977). Despite the implication from the term “informed 
consent” that the doctrine focuses primarily on facilitating “consents,” the doctrine of informed consent 
encompasses refusals as well as consents. Meisel et al., supra note 9, at 286; Roth et al., supra, at 282. Indeed, 
modern concepts place greater emphasis on the process of decisionmaking, as contrasted with the outcome. 
Meisel et al., supra note 9, at 288; Roth et al., supra, at 283. 
 80. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4609 (West 2020). 
 81. See GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 31–60. The initial empirical work of the MacArthur 
Treatment Competence researchers included: Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study I: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 105 
(1995) (hereinafter Applebaum & Grisso, MacArthur I); Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study II: Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 127 (1995) (hereinafter Grisso et al., MacArthur II); Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical 
Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995) (hereinafter Grisso & Applebaum, MacArthur III). 
 82. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW 
ENG. J. MEDICINE 1834, 1836 tbl.1 (2007).   
 83. See MacArthur I, supra note 81; MacArthur II, supra note 81; MacArthur III, supra note 81; see also 
GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10; Appelbaum, supra note 82; Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing 
Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 
345 (1996); MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW, THE MACARTHUR 
TREATMENT COMPETENCE STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/ 
treatment.html#N_1_ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 84. See Meisel et al., supra note 9; Roth et al., supra note 79; see also PAUL APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED 
CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A 
STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY (1984). The University of Pittsburgh group’s work also served as 
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of Pittsburgh group’s synthesis of concepts of treatment decisionmaking 
competence served as a core building block for the MacArthur group’s work.85 
The work of the MacArthur group has been extremely influential in modern 
formulations and assessment of treatment decisionmaking capacity in law, 
ethics, research, and clinical practice. The MacArthur group also developed 
standardized measures that can be used by health care practitioners (the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment, or MacCat-T)86 or 
researchers (the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical 
Research, or MacCAT-CR).87 The measures allow evaluators to customize the 
assessment of capacity for each treatment or research decisionmaking context. 
The MacArthur group’s work was largely completed in the 1990s, although 
the researchers have continued to produce important writings on the subject.88 
Their analyses and studies have influenced a third generation of researchers, who 
have extended, adapted, applied, and critiqued this foundational work.89 In 
addition to the proposal and development of alternative measures and 
assessment strategies, discourse has focused on a number of themes, including 
the need for improved training of health and mental health practitioners 
 
the foundation for other empirical studies of competence conducted prior to the MacArthur group’s work. See, 
e.g., Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed 
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982). For other “first-generation” discussions of the doctrine of 
informed consent, see FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 67; KATZ, supra note 67, at 171. 
 85. Roth et al., supra note 79. 
 86. THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR 
TREATMENT (MACCAT-T) (1998) [hereinafter MACCAT-T MANUAL]. 
 87. PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS GRISSO, MACCAT-T: THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT 
TOOL FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH (2001). 
 88. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 82. 
 89. For summary and discussion of instruments and approaches to evaluating treatment competence, see  
AM. BAR ASS’N & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: 
A HANDBOOK FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS 56–58 (2008), https://www.apa.org/pi/aging/programs/assessment/ 
capacity-psychologist-hadbook.pdf; THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS 
AND INSTRUMENTS 404–60 (2d ed. 2003); SCOTT Y. H. KIM, EVALUATION OF CAPACITY TO CONSENT TO 
TREATMENT AND RESEARCH 55–66 (2010); JENNIFER MOYE ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPACITY TO CONSENT 
TO TREATMENT: (ACCT): ADMINISTRATION AND TECHNICAL MANUAL 14–21 (2007); Laura B. Dunn et al., 
Assessing Decisional Capacity for Clinical Research or Treatment: A Review of Instruments, 163 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1323 (2006); Adam Gerstenecker et al., Enhancing Medical Decision-Making Evaluations: 
Introduction of Normative Data for the Capacity to Consent Treatment Instrument, 23 ASSESSMENT 232 (2015); 
Scott Lamont et al., Assessing Patient Capacity to Consent to Treatment: An Integrative Review of Instruments 
and Tools, 22 J. CLINICAL NURSING 2387 (2013); Jennifer Moye et al., Assessment of the Capacity to Consent 
to Treatment: Challenges, the “ACCT” Approach, Future Directions, 31 CLINICAL GERONTOLOGIST 37 (2007); 
Jennifer Moye et al., Empirical Advances in the Assessment of the Capacity to Consent to Medical Treatment: 
Clinical Implications and Research Needs, 26 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REV. 1054 (2006); Barton W. Palmer & 
Alexandrea L. Harmell, Assessment of Healthcare Decision-Making Capacity, 31 ARCHIVES CLINICAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 530 (2016); Laura L. Sessums et al., Does This Patient Have Medical Decision-Making 
Capacity?, 306 JAMA 420 (2011); Edward D. Sturman, The Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research: 
A Review of Standardized Assessment Tools, 25 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REV. 954 (2005); Astrid Vellinga et al., 
Instruments to Assess Decision-Making Capacity: An Overview, 16 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 397 (2004); Irma 
M. Hein et al., Accuracy of Assessment Instruments for Patients’ Competence to Consent to Medical Treatment 
or Research, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, https://www.cochranelibrary.com/ 
cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD011099.pub2/epdf/full (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
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conducting capacity evaluations,90 the challenges of lack of agreement in 
clinician assessments,91 further development, refinement, revision, or critique of 
the categories and criteria of treatment decisionmaking capacity,92 and 
consideration of the relative roles that standardized measures versus clinical 
judgment should play in the assessment of capacity.93 Despite the important 
expansion of empirical and theoretical work on assessment of treatment 
decisionmaking capacity, the template laid out by the MacArthur group remains 
the “gold standard,” and therefore will be relied upon in this Article. 
III.  CAPACITY TO DECIDE ABOUT MEDICAL AID IN DYING 
A. DEFINITIONS OF CAPACITY UNDER MEDICAL AID IN DYING STATUTES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
All jurisdictions authorizing medical aid in dying by statute require that, as 
a precondition for access to this assistance, the prescribing physician, a 
consulting physician, and in some instances also, a mental health specialist, 
certify that the patient has capacity to make health care decisions.94 The 
substantive definitions and procedures relating to the evaluation of decisional 
capacity are fairly consistent across the jurisdictions that regulate medical aid in 
dying by statute. For example, Oregon and four other jurisdictions provide the 
following generic definition of decisionmaking capacity: “the ability to make 
and communicate health care decisions to health care providers[.]”95 While the 
meaning of “ability to make . . . health care decisions” is not specified initially, 
more detail is provided in a subsequent section defining “informed decision.”96 
The Oregon statute indicates that an “informed decision” means a decision: 
[T]o request and obtain a prescription to end his or her life in a humane and 
dignified manner, that is based on appreciation of the relevant facts and after 
being fully informed by the attending physician of: (a) His or her medical 
diagnosis; (b) His or her prognosis; (c) The potential risks associated with 
taking the medication as prescribed; (d) The probable result of taking the 
 
 90. Lisa Seyfriend et al., Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity: Views and Experiences of Consultation 
Psychiatrists, 54 PSYCHOSOMATICS 115, 117 (2013). 
 91. See, e.g., Scott Y. Kim et al., Variability of Judgments of Capacity: Experience of Capacity Evaluators 
in a Study of Research Consent Capacity, 52 PSYCHOSOMATICS 346 (2011). 
 92. Lisa Eckstein & Scott Y.H. Kim, Criteria for Decision-Making Capacity: Between Understanding and 
Evidencing a Choice, 24 J.L. & MED. 678, 683–85 (2017); Christopher Slobogin, “Appreciation” as a Measure 
of Competency: Some Thoughts About the MacArthur Group’s Approach, 2 PSYCHOLOGY PUB. POL’Y & L. 18, 
24–27 (1996). 
 93. KIM, supra note 89, at 93–95. 
 94. See infra notes 95–123 and accompanying text. 
 95. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-102(10) (2019) (defining “mental capacity”); D.C. CODE § 7-661.01(2) 
(2019) (defining “capable”); ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 2140(2)(C) (2019) (defining “competent”); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 26:16-3 (West 2019) (defining “capable”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800 § 1.01(3) (2017); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 5281(2) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010(3) (2019) (defining “competent”). The states 
further define “informed decision,” by specifying that the individual has “based” the decision “on an 
understanding and acknowledgement of the relevant facts . . . .” See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-102(5)(b).  
 96. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-102(5). 
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medication to be prescribed; and (e) The feasible alternatives, including, but 
not limited to, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.97  
The definition of capacity contained in California’s End of Life Option Act 
initially provides a bit more guidance to evaluators regarding the relevant criteria 
for treatment decisionmaking capacity under the Act.98 Evaluating professionals 
are to determine that “the individual has the ability to understand the nature and 
consequences of the health care decision, the ability to understand its significant 
benefits, risks, and alternatives, and the ability to make and communicate an 
informed decision to health care providers.”99 California’s statute further defines 
an “informed decision” as one that is “based on an understanding and 
acknowledgement of the relevant facts, and that is made after being fully 
informed by the attending physician” of a similar list of elements of disclosure 
laid out in the Oregon statute, including “the possibility that the individual may 
choose not to obtain the drug or may obtain the drug but may decide not to ingest 
it.”100 Hawaii’s definition follows California’s lead with some minor changes in 
language.101  
These initial definitions of capacity found in the codes are incomplete 
however, if not viewed together with the additional criteria found in the sections 
of the statutes addressing referrals to mental health practitioners. If there are 
indications that the patient may not have decisional capacity, and the patient still 
wishes to pursue the request, the physician must refer the patient to a mental 
health professional for further assessment of capacity.102 In Oregon, the statute 
reads: “If in the opinion of the attending physician . . . a patient may be suffering 
from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired 
judgment,” a referral to a consulting mental health professional is made, with no 
life-ending drugs provided until that consultant “determines that the patient is 
not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing 
impaired judgment.”103 Maine, Washington, and the District of Columbia have 
 
 97. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800(7) (emphasis added). Most states provide a similar recitation of 
information that must be disclosed to the patient, and upon which the patient must base his or her decision. See, 
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-3 (West 2019) (“(1) the patient’s medical diagnosis; (2) the patient’s prognosis; 
(3) the potential risks associated with taking the medication prescribed; (4) the probable result of taking the 
medication prescribed; and (5) the feasible alternatives to taking the medication, including, but not limited to, 
concurrent or additional treatment opportunities, palliative care, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.”).   
 98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(e) (West 2020) (citing to CAL. PROB. CODE § 4609 (West 
2020)). 
 99. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(d). 
 100. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(i). 
 101. “‘Capable’ means that . . . a patient has the ability to understand the patient’s choices for care, including 
risks and benefits, and make and communicate health care decisions to health care providers.” HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 327L-1 (2019). 
 102. As noted below in infra notes 103–113, Hawaii departs from this procedure in that it requires all 
patients who request medical aid in dying to be evaluated by a mental health professional. See infra notes 114–
116. 
 103. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (2017). 
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adopted Oregon’s language verbatim.104 California’s language is similar, 
focusing the mental health consultation on whether “the individual has the 
capacity to make medical decisions and is not suffering from impaired judgment 
due to a mental disorder.”105 These formulations define a two-pronged test. The 
capacity evaluation must examine: (1) whether the patient is experiencing a 
psychiatric, psychological, or mental disorder, or depression; and (2) whether 
any such observed disorder or condition is causing impaired judgment. 
Existence of a mental disorder is not sufficient to render the patient incompetent 
under the statute if judgment is not impaired.106 
Colorado, New Jersey, and Vermont also require the attending physician 
to refer to a mental health specialist under certain circumstances. Yet, notably, 
these three states do not specify presence of mental, psychiatric, or 
psychological disorder, or depression, as a triggering feature and basis for 
referral and subsequent evaluation. Colorado focuses solely on the need for 
further assessment of decisionmaking capacity if the attending physician 
believes the patient “may not be mentally capable of making an informed 
decision.”107 New Jersey also grounds the referral on the attending physician’s 
judgment that the patient “may not be capable.”108 Vermont highlights the need 
for confirmation of whether the patient is capable and does not have impaired 
judgment.109 These latter approaches are superior to those that cite to depression 
or mental disorder as the basis for a more in-depth capacity evaluation because 
of the focus on observations of the patient’s functioning relative to the capacity 
standards,110 rather than on the existence of a mental disorder or psychological 
or psychiatric conditions or symptoms.111  
The existence of a mental disorder has historically led to presumptions of 
legal incompetence in a range of spheres.112 While the presumptive approach no 
longer prevails in the law, generalizations about the capacities of persons with 
mental disorders persist in practice. Language such as that in the Colorado, New 
Jersey, and Vermont statutes avoid undue focus on a diagnosis of mental 
disorder and may reduce the likelihood of inappropriate generalizations about 
 
 104. D.C. CODE § 7-661.01(4) (2019); ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 2140(8) (2019); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 70.245.010(5) (2019). 
 105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.1(k); 443.5(a)(1)(iii) (West 2020). 
 106. For a discussion of what is meant by “impaired judgment,” see infra notes 117–123 and accompanying 
text. 
 107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-106(1)(f) (2019) (“The attending physician shall . . . [r]efer the individual 
to a licensed mental health professional . . . if the attending physician believes that the individual may not be 
mentally capable of making an informed decision.”); § 25-48-108(2) (same). 
 108. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-8 (West 2019). 
 109. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283(a)(8) (2019). 
 110. See, e.g., KIM, supra note 89, at 11 (referring to the “functionalist model of competence” as meaning 
that “a person’s capacity status is determined by his demonstrable abilities” rather than a diagnosis or label).  
 111. Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 895 
(2011) (“Mental disorder per se is not a sufficient criterion for special legal treatment. All mental health laws 
require further legally relevant behavior, which is in fact the law’s primary concern.”). 
 112. See infra notes 144–145 and accompanying text. 
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the relationship between such conditions and capacity. Furthermore, they may 
alert evaluators to the possibility that factors other than mental disorder may 
affect capacity. As discussed below, research indicates that neurocognitive 
conditions, the effects of physical illness, and the effects of treatments such as 
chemotherapy and radiation may impair capacity.113 Although there are 
insufficient data to draw definitive conclusions, it is possible that in the 
population of persons who are medically eligible to request medical aid in dying 
in the United States, these latter factors constitute greater risks to 
decisionmaking capacity than do mental disorders. 
Hawaii departs from the other states in procedure and substantive criteria 
relating to mental health consultation. Hawaii requires the involvement of a 
mental health professional in all cases to provide a consulting capacity 
evaluation.114 The mental health practitioner provides a judgment as to whether 
the patient’s decision has been made voluntarily, whether “the patient is capable, 
and that the patient does not appear to be suffering from undertreatment or 
nontreatment of depression or other conditions which may interfere with the 
patient’s ability to make an informed decision.”115 Hawaii’s language is novel 
in its emphasis on the adequacy of treatment of conditions affecting treatment 
decisionmaking capacity rather than solely on the presence of the conditions.116 
This shift also has the benefit of focusing evaluators on the patient’s 
demonstrated functional capacity rather than solely on the existence of a 
diagnosis of a mental disorder.  
Only Vermont explicitly defines the term “impaired judgment” in its 
statute.117 The relevant provision states that impaired judgment is manifest when 
“a person does not sufficiently understand or appreciate the relevant facts 
necessary to make an informed decision.” In other words, in Vermont, a 
 
 113. See infra notes 212–243 and accompanying text. 
 114. HAW. REV. STAT. § 372L-4(a)(4) (2019). The University of California at San Francisco Medical Center 
has opted to refer all otherwise-qualified requesting patients for a capacity evaluation with mental health 
specialists, even though not required to do so under the California statutes. See, e.g., James A. Bourgeois et al, 
Physician-Assisted Death Psychiatric Assessment: A Standardized Protocol to Conform to the California End 
of Life Option Act, 39 PSYCHOSOMATICS 441 (2018). For an alternative perspective, see, for example, Linda 
Ganzini, Psychiatric Evaluations for Individuals Requesting Assisted Death in Washington and Oregon Should 
Not be Mandatory, 36 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 10, 10 (2014).  
 115. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327L-1; 372L-6. 
 116. Hawaii statutes impose the same obligation as do other states’ medical aid in dying laws to inform the 
patient of alternatives to medical aid in dying “including but not limited to comfort care, hospice care, and pain 
control.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-4(a)(3)(F) (2019). Ideally, if a practitioner determines that the patient has 
impaired judgment from a mental disorder or psychological condition that has not been effectively treated, that 
patient should be offered appropriate treatment for that mental health condition. One might speculate that, if 
such treatment is effective in treating a condition that impairs capacity, the patient can request reevaluation of 
capacity for the purpose of demonstrating eligibility under the medical aid in dying statute. The concept that an 
impaired legal capacity may be “restored” with treatment is a familiar one in the context of criminal adjudication, 
see, e.g., Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial from a Clinical 
Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 85 (2005); Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, 
Future Directions in the Restoration of Competency to Stand Trial, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 43, 
44 (2011), and may be equally applicable to this context. 
 117. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5281(5) (2019). 
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determination that a patient’s judgment is impaired is a finding that the patient 
has not satisfied one of the applicable legal standards of competence. A similar 
meaning of “impaired judgment” can be inferred from the language of the other 
states’ statutes as well. When referring to capacity, the legislatures clearly focus 
on patients’ abilities to make and communicate a treatment decision. It is 
therefore highly unlikely that the legislatures would have inserted the term 
“impaired judgment” to refer to something other than impairment in the ability 
to effectively employ one’s mental faculties in making such a decision. The core 
concern regarding capacity, as laid out in those statutes, is whether the patient is 
able to make a decision “based on an understanding . . . of the relevant 
facts . . . after being fully informed by the attending physician” of the elements 
of disclosure laid out in the statute.118  
It is useful to consider which of the standards of competence identified and 
studied by the MacArthur group are cited in the statutes. The terms 
“understanding” and “appreciation” appear in the statutes. Yet, there is no 
explicit mention of the concept of “reasoning.” Some jurisdictions’ statutes 
indicate that an “informed decision” is one that is based on the information 
provided by the attending physician. This language implies that patients must 
use the information in some way in order to demonstrate capacity. Does the 
concept of “making” an informed decision under the statutes necessarily require 
reasoning about the information provided, such as, for example, a weighing or 
balancing of risks and benefits?119  
The lack of legislative clarity on this matter does not indicate that reasoning 
is irrelevant to capacity determinations under the statutes. Clinicians tasked with 
evaluating capacity “to make health care decisions” must carry out that mandate 
consistent with ethical and professional standards. Those standards require 
professionals to avail themselves of the “established scientific and professional 
knowledge of the discipline.”120 “Reasoning” is generally recognized as a 
component of human thinking essential to effective decisionmaking.121 In 
addition, in the decades since the publication of the MacArthur group’s work, 
the health and mental health disciplines have generally endorsed the identified 
standards of competence. In light of these factors, and the important 
consequences of a determination of patient competence in this context, it may 
be appropriate for clinicians to strive to obtain a relatively comprehensive 
 
 118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(i) (West 2020). 
 119. The Mac-CAT-T rating criteria identify four forms of Reasoning on which patients must be scored: 
Consequential Reasoning (identifying specific treatment effects that may follow from the choice), Comparative 
Reasoning (articulating some form of comparison between at least two options), Generating Consequences 
(considering at least two reasonable everyday consequences of the treatment choices), and Logical Consistency 
(demonstrating a logical relationship between the choice and the reasons articulated supporting that choice). See 
MACCAT-T MANUAL, supra note 86. 
 120. Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, supra note 69. 
 121. See, e.g., Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, The Cognitive Psychology of Reasoning: An Introduction, 46A Q. 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 561, 561 (1993) (“Reasoning is the central activity in intelligent thinking. It is the 
process by which knowledge is applied to achieve most of our goals . . . . It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
study of reasoning has become the central focus in cognitive science.”).  
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picture of patient decisionmaking that incorporates assessment of reasoning as 
well as understanding and appreciation.122 In the event that a patient manifests 
variability in performance across standards, clinicians must confront difficult 
decisions about how to interpret those findings in deciding the ultimate legally 
relevant question of competence.123   
None of the statutes identifies the presence of a mental disorder as 
dispositive of capacity. There must be evidence that the disorder or condition is 
causing impaired judgment (that is, interfering substantially with those mental 
functions that reveal effective understanding and appreciation of and, possibly 
also reasoning about, the disclosed treatment information). As such, states that 
focus on whether a psychological condition may be impairing judgment are, in 
effect, asking the same question as jurisdictions that simply instruct physicians 
and consulting mental health professionals to determine whether or not a patient 
is capable of making the treatment decision. All states appear to view capacity 
consistent with widely accepted criteria for treatment competence laid out by the 
MacArthur group. The existence of a mental disorder or other psychological 
condition, where mentioned in the statute, serves either as a trigger for more 
careful scrutiny of capacity, or as an explanatory factor when functional 
capacities are found to be impaired. It does not, however, serve as an 
independent basis for a finding of incapacity. 
B. TREATMENT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY AND PERSONS WITH MENTAL 
DISORDERS 
Because of the statutory reference to “psychiatric or psychological disorder 
or depression causing impaired judgment,”124 or “impaired judgment due to a 
mental disorder,”125 this Subpart addresses the law, theory, and research related 
to the treatment decisionmaking competence of persons with mental disorders. 
It begins with a brief review of arguments that some have advanced suggesting 
that the decisional capacities of persons with mental disorders or depression 
should receive special scrutiny under the medical aid in dying statutes. Notably, 
however, modern American law presumes the competence of adults, even if 
those adults have mental disorders. Thus, as noted below, consistent with the 
provisions of U.S. medical aid in dying statutes, competence evaluations must 
assess the functional abilities relevant to the law rather than focus primarily on 
diagnostic formulations. 
 
 122. The breadth of the capacity evaluation does not, however, necessarily translate into a higher threshold 
for the demarcation of competent versus incompetent decisionmaking. See infra notes 266–289 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this factor.  
 123. The fourth standard of competence assesses whether the patient can identify and communicate a 
treatment decision. The state statutes require that patients personally request medical aid in dying orally and in 
writing in order to commence the formal process for consideration of their requests. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 443.3 (a), (b) (West 2020). As such, patients’ ability to comply with these statutory requirements 
will inform the question of competence under the first standard.  
 124. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (2017). 
 125. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.1(k), 443.5(a)(1)(iii) (West 2020). 
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1. Rationales for Additional Scrutiny of Treatment Decisionmaking 
Capacity of Persons with Mental Disorders or Depression  
Given that medical aid in dying facilitates the hastening of death, jurists, 
policymakers, health care professionals, advocacy groups, and others articulate 
a need to protect potentially vulnerable patients from “abuse, neglect and 
mistakes” resulting from “subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life 
situations.”126 In Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court cited concerns about 
persons whose autonomy and well-being were compromised by factors such as 
“membership in a stigmatized social group.”127 Recognizing this concern, states 
authorizing medical aid in dying have incorporated a range of substantive and 
procedural protections to protect against discrimination, abuses, and 
impediments to voluntary decisionmaking.128 Empirical findings from the states 
reveal that, under the current statutory frameworks for medical aid in dying in 
the United States, deleterious impacts on disadvantaged or vulnerable subgroups 
have not been observed.129 
In addition to concerns about vulnerability of persons with mental 
disorders to coercion or abuse, or the devaluation of their lives by some in 
society, some observers may have questions about the capacities of persons with 
mental disorders to make legally competent decisions. Such questions may be 
grounded in inaccurate generalizations about the functioning of persons with 
mental disorders. Alternatively, the questions may be more narrowly and 
appropriately focused, consistent with scientific findings revealing that a subset 
of individuals with severe mental disorders demonstrate impairments in 
treatment decisionmaking capacity.130  
The specific reference to depression in some medical aid in dying statutes 
may reflect a concern that those persons who are dying from a terminal disease 
 
 126. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731–32 (1997); Browne Lewis, A Deliberate 
Departure: Making Physician-Assisted Suicide Comfortable for Vulnerable Patients, 70 ARK. L. REV. 1, 51 
(2017) (asserting that current medical aid in dying statutes in the U.S. do not sufficiently protect vulnerable 
patients). But see Margaret P. Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: 
Evidence Concerning the Impact on Patients in “Vulnerable” Groups, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 591, 591–92 (2007) 
[hereinafter Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying] (discussing commonly raised concerns and concluding 
that current statutes do not place vulnerable patients at risk); Margaret P. Battin, Physician-Assisted Dying and 
the Slippery Slope: The Challenge of Empirical Evidence, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 91, 151 (2008) [hereinafter 
Battin, Slippery Slope] (same). 
 127. 521 U.S. at 732. 
 128. See supra note 45–52 and accompanying text; see also Thaddeus Pope, Implementation and Practice 
of Physician-Assisted Death: Safeguards, in THE NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED DEATH: SCANNING THE LANDSCAPE 76, 77 (2018) [hereinafter NAS, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH]. 
 129. See Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying, supra 126, at 591–92; Battin, Slippery Slope, supra 
note 126, at 151. Indeed, to the contrary, some commentators express concern that many of the laws’ protections 
operate like barriers⎯making it difficult for many patients to access medical aid in dying⎯and that such barriers 
have disproportionate impacts on persons with limited resources, education, and medical sophistication. 
Courtney Campbell, Implementation and Practice of Physician-Assisted Death: Access, in NAS, PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED DEATH, supra note 128, at 79; Alicia Ouellette, Barriers to Physician Aid in Dying for People with 
Disabilities, 6 LAWS, no. 4, 2017, at 1, 4–7. 
 130. See infra Subpart III.B.4.  
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may be more prone to depression than are those in the general population,131 and 
that persons who are depressed are less likely to have decisional capacity.132 
Some authors express a concern that persons with depression who elect medical 
aid in dying might be acting on a desire to commit suicide that is driven by 
psychopathology.133 Unfortunately, the distinction may not always be clear 
between a desire to die grounded in the psychopathology of depression and a 
desire to die grounded in physical, emotional, and spiritual suffering caused by 
the terminal illness, the dying process, and associated interventions.134 The 
diagnostic complexity in individual cases, or variations in the ways in which 
scholars and practitioners conceptualize desires to hasten death contribute to this 
lack of clarity.135   
 
 131. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730 (asserting a higher incidence of depression among those who are 
terminally ill); see infra note 138 and accompanying text for discussion regarding whether persons experiencing 
terminal illnesses reveal higher rates of mental disorders, including depression. 
 132. See infra Subpart III.B.2 and accompanying text for discussion of the research evaluating the treatment 
decisionmaking capacities of persons diagnosed with depression. 
 133. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730–31 (citing research that “uncontrolled pain” at the end of life 
can increase the likelihood of depression, and that many persons who request aid in dying withdraw requests if 
pain and depression are treated); Ellen H. Moskowitz, Mental Illness, Physical Illness, and the Legalization of 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 781, 791 (1997) (expressing concern that medical aid in 
dying laws will facilitate suicides by some terminally ill patients with mental disorders). But see COUNCIL ON 
PSYCHIATRY & LAW, APA RESOURCE DOCUMENT ON PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DEATH 16–18 (2017) (addressing 
diagnostic and conceptual complexity of determining the relationship between desire for hastened death and 
depression). 
 134. Keith G. Wilson et al., Desire for Euthanasia or Physician-Assisted Suicide in Palliative Cancer Care, 
26 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 314, 321 (2007) (noting that “the influence of depressive symptoms in motivating” 
requests for hastened death is unclear). COUNCIL ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW, supra note 133, at 15–18; Wendy G. 
Lichtenthal et al., Do Rates of Mental Disorders and Existential Distress among Advanced Stage Cancer Patients 
Increase as Death Approaches?, 18 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 50, 59–60 (“The challenge clinicians often face 
distinguishing normative distress from psychopathology is only exacerbated at end of life, a time during which 
patients are expected to experience some distress and in addition, suffer numerous overlapping physical 
symptoms.”). Elizabeth Goy, Linda Ganzini, and Tony Farrenkopf observe:  
Even for mental health professionals, diagnosing a major depressive disorder in terminally ill patients 
can be difficult. What appear to be depressive vegetative symptoms such as weight loss and loss of 
energy may be due to the underlying disease . . . . Mild psychological symptoms such as sadness, 
hopelessness, and difficulty experiencing pleasure may be realistic responses to a terminal prognosis 
and the limitations of severe medical illness. 
Elizabeth Goy et al., Mental Health Consultation, in THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: A GUIDEBOOK 
FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS (2008). 
 135. Various studies have investigated the relationship between the desire to die and the diagnosis of 
depression, revealing patterns of findings that underscore the complexities of this area of investigation. William 
Breitbart et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Hastened Death in Terminally Ill Patients with 
Cancer, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2907, 2907 (2000) (reporting that depression and hopelessness are the strongest 
predictors in study examining desire for hastened death in terminally ill cancer patients); Harvey Max Chochinov 
et al., Desire for Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1185, 1190 (1995); Kyriaki Mystakidou et 
al., Desire for Death Near the End of Life: The Role of Depression, Anxiety and Pain, 27 GEN. HOSP. 
PSYCHIATRY 258, 262 (reporting that psychological distress and an interaction between depression and pain 
medications are the strongest predictors of desire for hastened death); Keith G. Wilson et al., supra note 134, at 
321; Keith G. Wilson et al., Mental Disorders and the Desire for Death in Patients Receiving Palliative Care 
for Cancer, 6 BMJ SUPPORTIVE & PALLIATIVE CARE 170, 173 (2016) (reporting a higher proportion of palliative 
care patients with a depressive or anxiety-based mental disorder who expressed a serious desire for death than 
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The Canadian Parliament requested that a Canadian Academies group 
address questions relating to medical aid in dying and patients with mental 
disorder.136 The panel summarized the concerns about the relationship between 
mental disorder and requests to hasten death:  
In some instances (e.g., certain neurocognitive disorders like dementia, 
neurodevelopmental disorders and intellectual disabilities, and some cases of 
schizophrenia), there is a clear decline in the cognitive abilities needed to 
understand and appreciate information. In other instances (e.g., depressive, 
bipolar, and anxiety disorders), a person’s capacity for making decisions can 
be impaired by the disorder’s impact on their mood and emotions. For 
example, depression can impair one’s ability to deliberate about the 
future . . . or to maintain a minimal concern for self[.] Furthermore, some 
disorders, such as bipolar disorder, may be characterized by manic, 
depressive, or mixed states, in which the impact of emotion on capacity will 
vary.137 
The legally relevant question, of course, with respect to mental health 
assessments under the medical aid in dying statutes is whether the patient’s 
treatment decisionmaking capacity is impaired.138 Persons with mental 
disorders, by definition, experience some variant of atypical functioning in 
 
patients with no such disorder). But see COUNCIL ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW, supra note 133, at 15–18 (discussing 
the complex relationship of depression and the desire to die at the end of life and attendant diagnostic challenges); 
Linda Ganzini et al., The Effect of Depression Treatment on Elderly Patients’ Preferences for Life-Sustaining 
Medical Therapy, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1631, 1634 (1994) (reporting that treatment of depression did not 
alter mild to moderately depressed patient’s preferences to terminate life-sustaining treatment, but did alter the 
preferences of some more severely depressed patients); Lichtenthal et al., supra note 134, at 59 (reporting data 
that do not support the “common speculation that rates of depressive and anxiety disorders increase as patients 
approach death”); Ashok J. Bharucha et al, The Pursuit of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Role of Psychiatric 
Factors, 6 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 873, 873, 881-82 (2003) (reporting results from an empirical study examining 
the relationship of depression, decisionmaking capacity, and the desire for hastened death, and highlighting “the 
importance of avoiding reductionist understanding of the role of psychiatric illnesses in contributing to the 
serious pursuit of” medical aid in dying). 
 136. WHERE MENTAL DISORDER IS THE SOLE UNDERLYING MEDICAL CONDITION, supra note 49, at 64 
(citations omitted). For additional discussion of the possible impacts of mental disorder on treatment 
decisionmaking in the context of medical aid in dying, see, for example, Goy et al., supra note 134; COUNCIL 
ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW, supra note 133, at 15–18 (focusing on the relationship between the presence of 
depression and a desire to die in the population of persons experiencing terminal illnesses). 
 137. WHERE MENTAL DISORDER IS THE SOLE UNDERLYING MEDICAL CONDITION, supra note 49, at 64 
(citations omitted). For additional discussions of the possible impacts of mental disorder on treatment 
decisionmaking in the context of medical aid in dying, see, for example, Goy et al., supra note 134; COUNCIL 
ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW, supra note 133, at 15–18 (focusing on the relationship between the presence of 
depression and a desire to die in the population of persons experiencing terminal illnesses). 
 138. After reviewing the relevant research, psychologist James Werth Jr. stated, in language still appropriate 
today: 
[W]hether clinical depression is present in a given individual tells us very little about that person’s 
true desire for death, capacity to decide to hasten death, or whether a desire for death is or is not 
rational, reasonable, or impaired; depression is only one piece of a much larger puzzle related to a 
particular person’s desire to die. 
James L. Werth, Jr., Clinical Depression and the Desire for Death Among Persons with Terminal Illnesses, 5 
SOC. PATHOLOGY 22, 33 (1999).  
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cognitive, emotional, or behavioral domains.139 Thus, the decisionmaking 
capacity of some subset of those persons might be deleteriously affected. 
Categorical presumptions of incapacity of persons with mental disorders are 
legally disfavored today. Yet, there remains greater scrutiny of the 
decisionmaking capacities of persons with mental disorders in a range of 
contexts. Statutes in states like Vermont or New Jersey reflect a substantial 
advance away from presumptive classification of persons with mental disorders, 
in that they do not identify mental disorders or depression specifically as a 
possible basis for incapacity, but require a referral for further evaluation of 
decisionmaking capacity based on initial determination that such capacities may 
be impaired.140  
2. Diagnosis of Mental Disorder or Depression and Presumption of 
Incapacity 
Under modern legal standards, adults are presumed competent to make 
treatment decisions. In the United States, modern law recognizes “a rebuttable 
presumption affecting the burden of proof that all persons have the capacity to 
make decisions and to be responsible for their acts or decisions.”141 A diagnosis 
of a mental or physical disorder does not create a presumption of 
incompetence.142 MacArthur researchers Thomas Grisso and Paul Appelbaum 
assert that the “most fundamental, important, and uncontroversial maxim [they] 
can offer about the modern concept of legal competence is that [the] 
presumption” that persons with mental disorders, mental disabilities, or 
cognitive impairments are per se incompetent to make treatment decisions “is 
obsolete.”143  
Prior to the latter decades of the 20th Century, persons with mental 
disorders were considered de facto incompetent relative to most legal capacities, 
including relative to treatment decisionmaking capacity.144 Despite the shift in 
 
 139. According to the DSM-V, a “mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant 
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the 
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning.” DSM-V, supra note 16, 
at 20. 
 140. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text. 
 141. CAL. PROB. CODE § 810(a)–(b) (West 2020) (“A person who has a mental or physical disorder may 
still be capable of contracting, conveying, marrying, making medical decisions, executing wills or trusts, and 
performing other actions.”); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5331 (West 2020) (“No person may be presumed to be 
incompetent because he or she has been evaluated or treated for mental disorder or chronic alcoholism, regardless 
of whether such evaluation or treatment was voluntarily or involuntarily received.”). 
 142. GRISSO, supra note 89, at 392 (“The mere fact of mental illness, disability, or involuntary 
hospitalization does not create a presumption of incompetence to consent to or refuse most treatments.”).  
 143. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 18–19 (“Courts across the land have made it consistently 
clear that the presence of mental illness, mental retardation, or dementia alone does not render a person 
incompetent.”).   
 144. “Courts often accepted a clinician’s diagnosis of mental illness as all that was required to settle the 
matter” of a person’s competence to consent to treatment. Id. The presumption that persons with “serious mental 
illness” were per se incompetent to consent to treatment was generally recognized by both mental health 
practitioners and actors in the legal system. Id.; see also Celia B. Fisher, A Goodness-of-Fit Ethic for Informed 
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the formal status of persons with mental disorders regarding presumptions of 
capacity, there remain legal actors and medical and mental health professionals 
who assume that mental disorders or psychological conditions render an 
individual per se incompetent to make treatment decisions.145 In the context of 
medical aid in dying, evidence of this bias can be found in a national survey of 
mental health practitioners conducted shortly after the passage of Oregon’s 
Death with Dignity statute. It revealed that, for example, a substantial proportion 
of respondents viewed a diagnosis of one of several depressive disorders as a 
per se basis for a determination of incompetence to choose medical aid in 
dying.146 Yet, in another study,147 when study participant licensed psychologists 
were provided with vignettes of hypothetical patients requesting medical aid in 
dying, and the patient characteristics included scores on a clinical measure of 
depression and scores on a measure operationalizing legal standards of treatment 
decisionmaking competence,148 the participants prioritized the competence data 
in evaluating treatment decisionmaking capacity.149 This finding may indicate 
that, in the presence of clinical data more relevant to the legal criteria than 
diagnosis, practitioners focus on the former, minimizing the impact of a priori 
presumptions about the relationship of depression and decisionmaking 
competence.150 There is, however, a need for additional research addressing the 
 
Consent, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159, 159 (2002) (“Historically, adults with known mental disorders were 
presumed incompetent and restricted from opportunities to make decisions for themselves.”); Bruce J. Winick, 
The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 6, 12 (1995) (observing, in the 1990’s, that the law often regarded persons with mental disorders as legally 
incompetent). 
 145. Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 
2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 137, 151, 153 (1996) (“In the 19th century, mental illness was regarded 
as . . . invariably destroy[ing] decision-making ability. . . . Modern American mental health law has been 
moving in the direction of a presumption in favor of competence. Yet, 19th-century notions equating mental 
illness with incompetence continue to influence legal rules and practices in this area.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 146. See, e.g., Linda Ganzini et al., Evaluation of Competence to Consent to Assisted Suicide: Views of 
Forensic Psychiatrists, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 595, 599 tbl.4 (2000). In a national survey of forensic 
psychiatrists, fifty-eight percent of respondents viewed diagnosis of a major depressive disorder as dispositive 
of incompetence. Id. Approximately one-third of respondents also viewed a patient’s diagnosis with several less 
serious depressive disorders, including “adjustment disorder with depressed mood,” as providing conclusive 
evidence of incompetence to choose medical aid in dying. Id.  
 147. Shara M. Johnson et al., What Patient and Psychologist Characteristics Are Important in Competency 
for Physician-Assisted Suicide Evaluations?, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 420, 421 (2015). 
 148. For discussion of the measure, the MacCAT-T and its development, see supra 84–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 149. Johnson et al., supra note 147, at 428. 
 150. Alternatively, or in addition, the differential findings of this study and the reporting may reflect 
differences between the disciplines of practitioners, increasing sophistication about assessment of treatment 
decisionmaking capacity within the mental health professions, and shifts in attitudes about the acceptability of 
medical aid in dying. Ganzini et al., supra note 146, at 600. Ironically, however, Johnson and colleagues’ own 
commentary regarding this finding is somewhat puzzling: 
Clinicians were provided with a [Beck Depression Inventory] score for the patient in the vignette as 
one means of manipulating competence and in an effort to gauge the importance of depressive 
symptoms in a competence evaluation [for medical aid in dying] . . . . Despite the emphasis placed 
on depressive disorders by the statute, the perceived importance of the [Beck Depression Inventory] 
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ways in which clinicians tasked with performing mental health evaluations 
under the medical aid in dying statutes incorporate data regarding mental 
disorder and depression. 
3. Determination of Psycholegal Capacities Through Assessment of 
Functional Abilities  
One of the most important research contributions to our understanding of 
legal competencies is the core principle that determinations of individual’s 
capacities must be based on direct assessment of the functional abilities that are 
required under the applicable legal standard.151 The existence of a mental 
disorder, cognitive impairment, or other condition should not, in itself, trigger a 
suspicion of incompetence.152 By contrast, the observed effects of a mental 
disorder, cognitive impairment, or other condition on an individual’s functioning 
in a sphere relevant to a legal competency can, and often should, lead a legal 
actor or health care professional to inquire as to a person’s capacity relative to 
the applicable legal standard.153 Such suspicions about capacity are not 
dispositive evidence of legal competence. Rather, they can serve as a basis of a 
referral for a criterion-relevant assessment that incorporates operationalization 
of the applicable legal standard.  
Only in a very limited subset of cases will individuals manifest pervasive 
and global incapacity across functional spheres.154 Because each type of legal 
competence is defined by functional criteria relevant to that legal context, 
assessments of each type of competence must track those situation-specific 
functional criteria.155 Therefore, impairments affecting capacity in one legal 
 
scores was unrelated to competence decisions, complicating the importance of depressive symptoms 
in[medical aid in dying] competence evaluations. . . . [T]he disconnect between the null influence of 
[depression inventory] scores and the fact that depression is specifically cited in the law is potentially 
troublesome. 
Johnson et al., supra note 147, at 428. My interpretation of Johnson and colleagues’ findings regarding the 
relationship between clinical evaluations of competence in the context of evidence of depression and MacCAT-
T scores differs. The study participants appear to be properly interpreting the statutory requirement that—in the 
absence of impairments in decisionmaking capacity due to a mental disorder or depression—the presence of a 
mental disorder, including depression, does not lead to a finding of incapacity.  
 151. See, e.g., KIM, supra note 89, at 11 (referring to the “functionalist model of competence” as meaning 
that “a person’s capacity status is determined by his demonstrable abilities” rather than a diagnosis or label).  
 152. Morse, supra note 111, at 895 (“Mental disorder per se is not a sufficient criterion for special legal 
treatment. All mental health laws require further legally relevant behavior, which is in fact the law’s primary 
concern.”). 
 153. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 19–20 (observing that there can be a relation between 
impaired mental states and legal incompetence in that those conditions can increase the risk that one’s 
functioning in the realm of treatment competence may be affected). 
 154. “Until recent years, the law tended to perceive individuals simply as incompetent or competent for all 
[legal] purposes.” Id. at 21. 
 155. GRISSO, supra note 89, at 9 (“No single legal criterion or test applies across all legal competencies. 
Each legal competence refers to somewhat different abilities.”). “Unfortunately, many writers and 
professionals—including, but not limited to . . . policymakers and health care personnel—-fail to differentiate 
among the various legal competencies.” Lois A. Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, in 4 
CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, & THE LAW 25, 49 (N. Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984). The legal, and therefore 
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sphere do not necessarily predict capacity in another legal sphere and do not 
obviate the necessity to perform focused criterion-relevant assessments of 
capacity targeted to any other legal question of interest. 
4. Empirical Research on Capacities of Persons with Mental Disorders 
to Make Treatment Decisions 
The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study incorporated into its 
landmark work an ambitious assessment and comparison of the decisionmaking 
capacities of groups of hospitalized patients with psychiatric and medical 
conditions and non-hospitalized persons in the community.156 Recently 
hospitalized patients diagnosed with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, 
major depression, or ischemic heart disease, and a non-ill community group 
were compared on measures of all four standards of treatment competence. The 
findings revealed substantial heterogeneity within and across the two groups of 
patients with mental disorders, with “impairments in performance . . . more 
pronounced and more consistent across measures for the schizophrenia patients 
than for patients with depression.”157 The investigators observed statistically 
significant differences between patients with mental disorders and other groups, 
particularly those patients with schizophrenia.158 Approximately 25% of the 
schizophrenic group scored in the “impaired” range on each measure of capacity, 
compared with 5-7% of the heart disease patients and 2% of the community 
group.159 At the same time, according to the researchers, approximately one-half 
of the schizophrenia group and three-quarters of the depression group 
“performed in the ‘adequate’ range . . . across all decisionmaking measures.”160 
The authors further point out that “the rate of adequate performance rose to 
roughly 75% for patients with schizophrenia and to approximately 90% or more 
for patients with depression” when examining the results from the single 
standard of competence that is relied upon in many jurisdictions (that is, 
“understanding”).161  
Subsequent studies report consistent results.162 For example, David Okai 
and colleagues review a series of studies and conclude that research comparing 
 
also psychological, standards for competence to make treatment decisions differ from competence to testify or 
competence to stand trial. Id. at 49–50. Furthermore, even in the context of the same legal standard, situational 
variables may present patients with more challenging, or more emotionally charged, information to process and 
apply in one context versus another. For expanded discussion of such additional relevant factors, see, for 
example, GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, 21–24. 
 156. Grisso & Applebaum, MacArthur III, supra note 81, at 150.   
 157. Id. at 169. 
 158. Id. at 171. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. David Okai et al., Mental Capacity in Psychiatric Patients: Systematic Review, 191 BRITISH J. 
PSYCHIATRY 291, 291 (2007); see also KIM, supra note 89, at 58–59; Vanessa Raymont et al., Prevalence of 
Mental Incapacity in Medical In-Patients and Associated Risk Factors: Cross-Sectional Study, 134 LANCET 
1421, 1425–26 (2004). 
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the decisionmaking capacities of hospitalized psychiatric patients and medical 
patients typically found most patients in the former group to be competent and 
did not observe substantial differences between the groups.163 The authors note 
the striking consistency of findings across studies.164 In an excellent analysis of 
the empirical literature on the impact of mental and cognitive disorders on 
treatment capacities, Scott Kim emphasizes the variations in patients’ assessed 
treatment decisionmaking capacities within diagnostic categories.165 He 
observes, for example, that while chronic psychotic disorders present a risk of 
incompetence, “there is tremendous heterogeneity in that group,” with many 
such patients performing quite well on competence measures initially, and others 
improving performance with supportive interventions to promote 
competence.166 Studies have also revealed that mild and moderately depressed 
individuals generally meet competence standards, as do most severely depressed 
persons.167 Only a minority of persons with severe depression reveal 
impairments that interfere with treatment decisionmaking capacity.168 
The findings support several conclusions. First, some patients with mental 
disorder may experience impairments in treatment decisionmaking capacity, 
particularly those patients with the most severe disorders that affect cognitive 
processes, such as schizophrenia. Many of the empirical studies assessing 
treatment capacities of persons with mental disorders focus primarily on 
psychiatric inpatients or persons who typically fall on the higher end on the 
continuum of severity of symptoms. Even in this population, many patients are 
found competent to make their treatment decisions. Most patients seeking 
medical aid in dying that are diagnosed with a mental disorder are not likely to 
 
 163. Okai et al., supra note 162, at 295. 
 164. Id. 
 165. KIM, supra note 89, at 37–54. 
 166. Id. at 45–48. 
 167. Id. at 49–50. 
 168. Id. For several views of the relationship between depression and medical aid in dying, see, for example, 
Thomas Hindmarch et al., Depression and Decision-Making Capacity for Treatment or Research: A Systematic 
Review, BMC MED. ETHICS, Dec. 13, 2013, at 2; Barry Rosenfeld, Assisted Suicide, Depression, and the Right 
to Die, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 467, 474 (2000); James L. Werth, Jr., supra note 138, at 33. Hindmarch 
and colleagues suggest that, of the four competence standards, the one most likely to be affected by clinical 
depression is “appreciation,” particularly to the extent that the depression interferes with a patient’s ability to 
understand the “situation-dependent, personal implications of that decision” for herself. Hindmarch et al., supra, 
at 2–3. They further emphasize that, while treatment decisionmaking capacity is framed as relying on cognitive 
abilities, there is an “interplay between cognition, emotion, and [decisionmaking capacity].” Id. at 6. This 
interplay is particularly evident when decisionmaking capacity is impaired by feelings of helplessness, 
hopelessness, guilt, or worthlessness often associated with severe depression, which may limit the ability to 
“appreciate future possibilities” or interfere with the ability to “maintain a minimal concern for self.” Id. at 6–8; 
see also Ian H. Gotlib & Jutta Joormann, Cognition and Depression: Current Status and Future Directions, 6 
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 285, 286 (2010). For critiques and alternatives to the conceptualization of 
appreciation encompassed within the MacArthur standards, see, for example, Elyn R. Saks et al., The California 
Scale of Appreciation: A New Instrument to Measure the Appreciation Component of Capacity to Consent to 
Research, 10 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 166, 166–67 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, “Appreciation” as a 
Measure of Competency: Some Thoughts About the MacArthur Group’s Approach, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 18, 19 (1996). 
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manifest the levels of severity experienced by psychiatric inpatients.169 Given 
the heterogeneity in decisionmaking capacities observed in the groups studied 
in the research reported above, focused criterion-based competence assessments 
are essential when persons who seek medical aid in dying are referred for a 
mental health consultation.  
Second, the findings of the MacArthur study and subsequent research 
reveal that the modern legal position that competence should be presumed for 
adults with or without mental disorders is consistent, from a statistical 
standpoint, with the functional abilities of many persons who fall into these two 
groups.170 Therefore, it is appropriate to maintain this presumption until clinical 
evidence of incapacity leads to its rebuttal for individual patients. 
Third, and related to another component of the empirical literature, patients 
often perform better on competence measures if they are given the opportunity 
to “learn” the information that is relevant to the treatment decision, either 
through repeated exposure, or through efforts to “teach” the information to those 
who do not demonstrate competence first-time around.171 This latter observation 
reinforces the more modern recognition that, at times, patients’ lack of 
understanding and apparent incompetence is sometimes related to deficits in 
communication of the health care information by practitioners.172 Thus, many 
scholars and health policymakers have focused attention on the need to improve 
such communications in order to promote patients’ understanding, reasoning, 
and decisionmaking regarding treatment choices.173 Furthermore, health care 
practitioners must take affirmative steps to “enhance the capacity of the 
 
 169. See infra notes 193–200, 244–248 and accompanying text. 
 170. In applying a legal presumption, a court assumes that what is most likely to be true is true, unless 
sufficient evidence is introduced to rebut the presumption. See e.g., Jason R. Bent, The Telltale Sign of 
Discrimination: Probabilities, Information Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory, 44 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 797, 822 (2011); James J. Vedder & Brittney M. Miller, Presumptions in Paternity Cases: 
Who Is the Father in the Eyes of the Law?, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 26, 26 (“Legal presumptions are a useful and 
efficient way to deal with legal questions. A legal presumption is essentially a legal shortcut. It allows the court 
to reach a conclusion once a specific set of facts is established. The burden of proof then shifts to the other party 
to rebut the presumption.”) (citing FED. R. EVID. § 301). 
 171. KIM, supra note 89, at 47–48; William T. Carpenter, Jr. et al., Decisional Capacity for Informed 
Consent in Schizophrenia Research, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 533, 537 (2000); Grisso & Appelbaum, 
MacArthur III, supra note 81, at 173. 
 172. See e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Certified Patient Decision Aids: Solving Persistent Problems with 
Informed Consent Law, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12, 22 (2017). 
 173. For summary and analysis of empirical research findings and recommendations on improving health 
information communication, see, for example, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMMUNICATING RISKS AND BENEFITS: 
AN EVIDENCE-BASED USER’S GUIDE 1–2 (Baruch Fischhoff et al. eds., 2011); THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
HEALTH COMMUNICATION 37 (Teresa L. Thompson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003); Austin S. Babrow et al., Managing 
Uncertainty in Illness Explanation: An Application of Problematic Integration Theory, in EXPLAINING ILLNESS: 
RESEARCH, THEORY & STRATEGIES 41, 41 (Bryan B. Whaley ed., 2000); Ellen Peters et al., The Functions of 
Affect in Health Communications and in the Construction of Health Preferences, 56 J. COMMUNICATION S140, 
S156 (2006). 
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individual to meaningfully participate in his/her healthcare decision-making,” 
regardless of the initial observed level of capacity.174  
Substantial attention now has been directed toward the science of health 
information communication as an independent area of inquiry and research, as 
well as a component of the “shared decisionmaking” model.175 This has led to 
development of a range of innovative strategies, including availability of 
“decision aids.”176 Even patients with no impairments due to medical disorder 
can benefit from presentation of health care information in a manner that 
facilitates comprehension and cognitive and emotional processing by the 
recipient. Persons with psychological impairments are likely to benefit even 
more substantially from such strategies. Modern frameworks have 
reconceptualized communications about health care information between 
practitioners and patients.177 Such communications are increasingly viewed as 
dialogues that may occur over time in multiple meetings. This contrasts with the 
traditional one-time and one-way interaction in which the practitioner discloses 
information to be received by the patient. This interactive model, frequently 
discussed within the “shared decisionmaking” literature, is likely to enhance 
patient decisionmaking capabilities and improve patients’ responses to their 
overall health care situation.178 Patients are likely to benefit as well from 
 
 174. Barton W. Palmer & Alexandrea L. Harmell, Assessment of Healthcare Decision-Making Capacity, 31 
ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 530, 537 (2016). 
 175. For more information about this model, see, for example, Emily Oshima Lee & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, 
Shared Decision Making to Improve Care and Reduce Costs, 368 N. ENG. J. MEDICINE 6, 6 (2013); see also 
DARTMOUTH-HITCHCOCK, CENTER FOR SHARED DECISION MAKING, https://med.dartmouth-
hitchcock.org/csdm_toolkits.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2020); NAT’L LEARNING CONSORTIUM, SHARED 
DECISION MAKING (2013), www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/nlc_shared_decision_making_fact_sheet.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 176. See e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, IMPACT OF CANCER-RELATED DECISION 
AIDS 2–3 (2002); Annette M. O’Connor et al., Toward The “Tipping Point”: Decision Aids and Informed Patient 
Choice, 26 HEALTH AFF. 716, 717 (2007); Palmer & Harmell, supra note 89, at 537 (noting empirical findings 
on the  benefits to patients of multimedia decision aids for a range of medical conditions and decision types); 
Pope, supra note 172, at 21–25 (summarizing effectiveness of patient decision aids in promoting patient 
understanding); Dawn Stacey et al., Decision Aids for Patients Facing Health Treatment or Screening Decisions, 
COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, https://www.cochrane.org/CD001431/COMMUN_decision-
aids-help-people-who-are-facing-health-treatment-or-screening-decisions (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). These 
instruments, which may include written materials with pictorial images, videos and other multimedia modalities, 
or computer-based interactive approaches, take advantage of newer understandings about human learning, and 
have the potential to render health care information accessible to patients for whom standardized written or oral 
disclosures are insufficient to promote comprehension. 
 177. See generally BETTER DOCTORS, BETTER PATIENTS, BETTER DECISIONS: ENVISIONING HEALTH CARE 
2020 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. eds., 2011); ADRIAN EDWARDS & GLYN ELWYN, SHARED DECISION-MAKING IN 
HEALTH CARE: ACHIEVING EVIDENCE-BASED PATIENT CHOICE (2d ed. 2009). 
 178. Indeed, providing patients with information about the possible courses of their medical problems and 
treatment options has been shown to improve their coping, reduce anxiety, and diminish other aversive reactions.  
See, e.g., Erling A. Anderson, Preoperative Preparation for Cardiac Surgery Facilitates Recovery, Reduces 
Psychological Distress, and Reduces the Incidence of Acute Postoperative Hypertension, 55 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 513, 516–18 (1987); Paul G. Greene et al., Preparation for Cesarean Delivery: A 
Multicomponent Analysis of Treatment Outcome, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 484, 484 (1989); 
Jerry Suls & Choi K. Wan, Effects of Sensory and Procedural Information on Coping with Stressful Medical 
Procedures and Pain: A Meta-Analysis, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 372, 377–78 (1989). In 
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involvement of trusted family members and significant others in some of these 
informational sessions.179 It is critical that any assessments of patient capacities 
in the context of medical aid in dying occur only after the evaluating practitioner 
ensures that patients have been adequately educated about the material elements 
of information in a manner most likely to facilitate competent decisionmaking.  
Research reveals that the treatment decisionmaking capacities of patients 
who are seriously ill— a subset of whom may request medical aid in dying—
may shift over time due to fluctuations in their medical condition, emotional 
state, and treatment effects.180 Therefore, repeated assessment of competence 
may be warranted when the initial evaluation reveals impairments in 
decisionmaking skills.181 Such a practice increases the likelihood that evaluators 
will obtain a more comprehensive picture of these patients’ abilities. 
C. THE POPULATION: WHO SEEKS MEDICAL AID IN DYING IN THE UNITED 
STATES? 
1. Data from the States 
The most substantial body of data about the persons who seek medical aid 
in dying in the United States can be found on the website of the Health Authority 
of the State of Oregon.182 Since the inception of Oregon’s policy, prescriptions 
for lethal medication were provided under the statute for 2217 people. Of these 
1459 or 65.8% are known to have died from ingesting the medication.183 The 
rate of the statute’s usage has increased gradually throughout the twenty years 
that the option for medical aid in dying has been available.184 The cumulative 
20-year data reveals that patients who have used the prescription to hasten their 
deaths present a distinct demographic profile. They are predominantly age 65 
and older (72.8%) with a median age of 72 years, 96.4% White, and most (73%) 
 
addition, open, responsive, and interactive communication improves the rapport and relationship between the 
practitioner and patient. See Jennifer Fong Ha et al., Doctor-Patient Communication: A Review, 10 OSCHSNER 
J. 38, 38–39 (2010); John M. Traveline, et al., Patient-Physician Communication: Why and How, 105 J. AM. 
OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N. 13, 14 (2005). 
 179. For a discussion of the importance of relationships to promoting effective end-of-life decisionmaking 
and enhancing decisionmaking capacity, see Wright, supra note 64. 
 180. NANCY BERLINGER ET AL., THE HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES FOR DECISIONS ON LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT AND CARE NEAR THE END OF LIFE 53 (2d ed. 2013) (citing as “reversible” factors affecting capacity 
of medical patients: “fatigue, metabolic factors, overmedication, undertreatment of pain, or delirium induced by 
the stress of hospitalization”).  
 181. See Palmer & Harmell, supra note 174, at 537–38 (emphasizing the importance of reassessment of 
capacity when a patient does not initially test as capable, in light of factors such as fatigue, anxiety, fluctuations 
in health status, or need for further education). 
 182. The state publishes an annual report, which contains cumulative information dating back to the 
implementation of the law in 1998. See, e.g., OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY, OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY 
ACT: 2018 DATA SUMMARY 4 (2019). 
 183. Id. at 5. 
 184. Id. at 4 fig.1. The year 2018 saw the highest usage, with 249 requests for prescriptions granted and 157 
deaths from ingesting the medication. Id. at 5. Forty-eight persons are known not to have ingested the medication, 
while the ingestion status of another forty-three patients is not yet known. Id. 
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have had at least some college education.185 Most (90.2%) were enrolled in 
hospice, and almost all (98.8%) were covered by either private or public 
insurance.186 The qualifying medical condition for 76% of the patients was some 
form of cancer, 11% were diagnosed with a neurological disease such as 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), 9.5% were diagnosed with cardiac disease, 
and 7.7% were diagnosed with respiratory disease.187 Oregon regularly collects 
data on the end of life concerns that lead patients to choose medical aid in dying. 
Patients can cite multiple reasons. The twenty-year data reveal that the most 
significant motivators are psychological and psychosocial: loss of autonomy 
(95.5%), lessened ability to engage in life activities (94.6%), and loss of dignity 
(79.4%).188 Other concerns cited focus on loss of control of bodily functions 
(56.5%), possible burdens on family, friends and caregivers (51.9%), worries 
regarding inadequate pain control (29.8%) and financial implications of 
treatment (4.7%).  
Oregon reports how many of the patients who ultimately died from 
ingestion of lethal prescriptions had been referred for mental health evaluation 
(4.5% over twenty years).189 Clearly, if those patients were approved for receipt 
of the lethal prescription, compliance by the prescribing health care professional 
requires that those patients were determined to be competent by the consulting 
mental health professional. Yet, there are several other groups of patients for 
whom data are not available. Oregon does not provide data on whether patients 
who received prescriptions, but did not take the medication, had been referred 
for a mental health evaluation. It also does not report data on patients who 
requested medical aid in dying, were referred for mental health evaluation, and 
were found not to be competent.190 Thus, we must rely on data obtained 
independently by other researchers to learn about the mental health status of 
patients seeking medical aid in dying who did not die from the lethal 
prescriptions. 
Washington’s statute has been operative since 2009, and the state’s data 
summaries report statistics through 2017.191 The findings from Washington and 
the other states issuing reports, including California, present a fairly similar 
picture, demographically, and with respect to underlying medical conditions, to 
that reported by Oregon.192 As in Oregon, the state-reported data tell us nothing 
 
 185. Id. at 8 tbl.1. The percentage of persons using medical aid in dying in Oregon who have completed 
college or have graduate degrees is 43.8. Id. 
 186. Id. at 10 tbl.1. 
 187. Id. at 11 tbl.1. 
 188. Id. at 12 tbl.1. 
 189. Id. at 11 tbl.1. 
 190. There are other subsets of patients for whom data regarding mental health status is also not available, 
such as patients who were referred for a mental health evaluation, but became too ill to proceed, or died prior to 
completing the process. 
 191. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2018 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT REPORT 5 (2019), 
https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/422-109-DeathWithDignityAct2018.pdf. 
 192. For example, in 2017, 74% of patients who hastened their deaths under the provisions of the 
Washington statute were age 65 or older; 94% were White, 75% had some college, and almost all were insured. 
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about patients’ capacity. We can assume, of course, that those patients described 
in the data were determined to be competent, either by the attending physician 
(who did not refer for a mental health evaluation) or by the consulting mental 
health practitioner.  
Other researchers have investigated a number of variables relating to 
patients seeking medical aid in dying in Oregon. According to some studies, a 
subset of patients who request and receive medical aid in dying appear to their 
physicians to be depressed or meet certain clinical criteria of depression.193 One 
researcher concluded from these data that “the current practice of legalised [sic] 
aid in dying may allow some potentially ineligible patients to receive a 
prescription for a lethal drug.”194 Yet, the relationship between depression and 
potential ineligibility for medical aid in dying is perhaps less clear than is 
implied here. The existence of depression—even where the condition meets 
criteria for a diagnosable mental disorder—does not lead to a finding, or even a 
presumption, of incompetence. This important principle not only guides modern 
legal formulations regarding treatment competence more generally, but also 
reflects the legislative intent of the drafters of the statutes of all states permitting 
medical aid in dying. In order to find a patient ineligible due to incapacity in 
Oregon and other states, the evaluator must make two findings. He or she must 
find not only that there is a mental disorder or depression, but also that such a 
condition is causing impaired judgment.195  
The empirical research on the capacities of patients with depressive 
disorders suggests that most will meet legal standards for treatment 
decisionmaking capacity—or in the language of the statutes—would not 
manifest impaired judgment.196 Such capacity must be evaluated directly with a 
 
Id. at 6 tbl.1. The distribution of categories of underlying disease and concerns motivating use of medical aid in 
dying track the Oregon data fairly closely. Id. at 6, 8 tbl.1. Even California, with its ethnic diversity, reports that 
88.9% of persons hastening their deaths through medical aid in dying were White, and 72.7% had some college 
education. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA END OF LIFE OPTION ACT 2017 DATA REPORT 4 (2018), 
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHSI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/2017EOLADataReport.pdf. Data 
collected Vermont, and Colorado also present a consistent picture. See VT. DEP’T OF HEALTH, REPORT 
CONCERNING PATIENT CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE (2018), https://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Legislative-
Reports/2018-Patient-Choice-Legislative-Report-12-14-17.pdf; COLORADO DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, 
COLORADO END-OF-LIFE OPTIONS ACT, YEAR TWO, 2018 DATA SUMMARY, WITH UPDATES TO 2017 DATA 
(2018), https://www.deathwithdignity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2018-CO-End-of-Life-Options-Act-
Annual-Report.pdf. Hawaii, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, and Maine have not yet published data 
reports.  
 193. Diane E. Meier et al., Characteristics of Patients Requesting and Receiving Physician-Assisted Death, 
163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1537, 1538 (2003). Linda Ganzini et al., Prevalence of Depression and Anxiety 
in Patients Requesting Physicians’ Aid in Dying: Cross Sectional Survey, BMJ, Aug. 2018, at 1. 
 194. Id. at 3. 
 195. The pertinent provisions of the Oregon statute read: “If in the opinion of the attending physician . . . a 
patient may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment,” 
a referral to a consulting mental health professional is made, with no life-ending drugs provided until that 
consultant “determines that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression 
causing impaired judgment.” OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (2017).   
 196. See supra Subpart III.B.4.  
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functional assessment using criterion-relevant measures or techniques.197 Thus, 
while it is troubling that there is a dearth of data as to what proportion of patients 
requesting medical aid in dying might be disqualified because of mental 
disorders impairing judgment, we must also be cautious about questioning the 
eligibility of depressed patients who were found capable. Without more 
information, we do not know whether physicians were applying the statutory 
requirements correctly—requiring both findings—or whether other factors led 
to the inclusion of some persons viewed or diagnosed as depressed.198 Dr. Diane 
Meier and colleagues observe:  
While our respondents were less likely to honor a request for assistance in 
dying from a depressed patient, nonetheless physicians did assist some 
individuals whom they believed were depressed at the time of their 
request. . . . [P]hysicians may reason that it is normal to be depressed or may 
be unable to distinguish depression from sadness under circumstances of 
terminal illness, may believe that depression in this clinical context is 
untreatable, or may have tried and failed to treat their patient’s depression. It 
is also possible that they believed that depression was not interfering with 
decisional capacity and was not the primary reason for the request, and was 
therefore of less salience in their decision to honor it.199 
Meier and colleagues recommend education of physicians regarding the 
prevalence and treatability of depression in the population of persons 
experiencing a terminal illness.200  
While it is important not to presume incapacity based on the presence of a 
mental disorder, psychological symptoms, or depression, it is also important that 
the psychological suffering and mental health challenges of persons requesting 
medical aid in dying be identified when they exist. To the extent that these 
experiences and conditions impair capacity to decide regarding medical aid in 
dying, such information is relevant to that person’s eligibility under the statutes. 
Yet, even for persons who meet statutory capacity requirements, whether or not 
they meet criteria for diagnosis of a mental disorder, the medical aid in dying 
request provides an opportunity for health care personnel to offer support and 
services that might ease such suffering.201 
 
 
 
 
 197. See supra Subpart IV.B. 
 198. Ironically, the researchers administered the MacArthur competence assessment tool to determine if the 
individual was competent to consent to the research participation. Ganzini et al., supra note 193, at 2. All 
participants were determined to be competent. Id. at 1. While capacity to consent to the research study and 
capacity to consent to medical aid in dying will differ because the types of information to be understood, 
appreciated, and reasoned about are not identical, there is substantial similarity in competence to consent to 
treatment and to research. Id. at 2. The competence of the participants to consent to research may provide some 
support for the hypothesis that these individuals’ depressive symptoms had minimal impact on those facets of 
their judgment necessary to satisfy the competence standards. See id. at 2. 
 199. Meier et al., supra note 193, at 1541. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See infra Part V. 
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2. Psychological and Neurocognitive Factors Affecting Persons at the 
End of Life Due to a Terminal Illness 
a. Psychological Distress or Mental Disorder  
There is general agreement in the scientific literature that persons in the 
later stages of terminal disease experience emotional suffering to a greater extent 
than do persons in the general population.202 “A life-threatening illness has 
widespread ramifications affecting a person’s physical, emotional, social, and 
spiritual well-being.”203 There is somewhat more debate, however, as to whether 
there is indeed a higher prevalence of mental disorder among those with such 
serious diseases. For example, Wendy Lichtenthal and colleagues found that 
“patients closer to death reported increased existential distress without a parallel 
increase in rates of psychiatric disorders.”204 By contrast, another study found 
that “about 50% (or more) of patients with advanced cancer meet criteria for a 
psychiatric disorder.”205 The investigators of this latter study caution however, 
that this statistic relies on the inclusion of “the diagnosis of adjustment 
disorder.”206 Adjustment disorders are typically viewed as less serious mental 
disorders, and are identified by the presence of certain psychological 
symptomatology accompanying an individual’s reaction to a stressful life 
event.207 The challenge of coping with a life-threatening disease would certainly 
qualify as such a stressful life event. Thus, while most studies report increased 
psychological distress at the end of life, reported prevalence of diagnosable 
mental disorders varies widely from study to study.208 These discrepant findings 
may result in part from a failure to distinguish between more and less severe 
 
 202. See, e.g., Harvey Max Chochinov, Psychiatry and Terminal Illness, 45 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 146–
48 (2000); Wendy Lichtenthal et al., Do Rates of Mental Disorders and Existential Distress Among Advanced 
Stage Cancer Patients Increase as Death Approaches? 18 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 50, 54 (2009); Alex J. Mitchell 
et al., Prevalence of Depression, Anxiety, and Adjustment Disorder in Oncological, Haematological, and 
Palliative-Care Settings: A Meta-Analysis of 94 Interview-Based Studies, 12 LANCET ONCOLOGY 160, 167 tbl.2 
(2011). 
 203. Katherine LeMay & Keith Wilson, Treatment of Existential Distress in Life Threatening Illness: A 
Review of Manualized Interventions, 28 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 472, 472 (2008). 
 204. Lichtenthal et al., supra note 134, at 58.  
 205. Michael Miovic & Susan Block, Psychiatric Disorders in Advanced Cancer, 110 CANCER 1665, 1666 
(2007). 
 206. Id.; see also Mitchell et al., supra note 202, at 170 (discussing importance of distinguishing among 
“major and minor depression, dysthymia, adjustment disorder, and anxiety disorder” and reporting results of a 
meta-analysis, revealing a rate of up to 38.2% of emotional disorder, including “all types of depression and 
adjustment disorder” in adults with cancer in palliative care settings). 
 207. See DSM-V, supra note 16, at 286–89. 
 208. See Robert L. Fine, Depression, Anxiety, and Delirium in the Terminally Ill Patient, 14 BAYLOR U. 
MED. CTR. PROC. 130, 130 (2001) (citing reports of incidence of major depression in terminally ill patients 
ranging from 25% to 77%); Chong Guan Ng et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity Among Terminally Ill Patients in 
General Practice in the Netherlands: A Comparison Between Patients with Cancer and Heart Failure, BRITISH 
J. GEN. PRAC. e63, e63, e66, e67 (2013) (citing prior estimated rates of psychiatric disorder in patients with 
cancer of 20 to 60 percent and reporting high use of psychotropic drugs at end of life). 
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conditions. Another factor explaining inconsistent results across studies may be 
variations in sampling, such as differences in the stage of disease progression of 
patients included in the estimates.209 Finally, variations in reports may result 
from the challenges of distinguishing between the presence of a mental disorder 
and the psychological distress attendant to the grief, loss, and suffering that often 
accompanies the process of dying from a terminal disease.210  
Persons who meet the medical qualifications for aid in dying in the United 
States may be at a higher risk than are persons in the general population for a 
range of manifestations of psychological distress, whether or not those 
experiences and symptoms satisfy diagnostic requirements for a mental disorder. 
Clinicians assessing competence under the medical aid in dying statutes must be 
attuned to these symptoms and determine whether these symptoms impair 
decisionmaking capacity. Furthermore, as discussed below, clinicians must also 
consider whether there are psychological or psychopharmacological treatment 
interventions that might mitigate the patient’s distress, symptoms, or disorder. 
Informing patients of these treatment options falls within the charge of health 
care professionals under the medical aid in dying statutes, encompassed within 
the requirement to inform patients of alternative treatments, such as palliative or 
comfort care.211  
b. Neurocognitive Impairments 
Although the medical aid in dying statutes direct attention to mental 
disorders and psychological conditions like various forms of depression, persons 
who meet the medical qualifications for medical aid in dying may be more likely 
to experience impairments in decisionmaking capacity due to neurocognitive 
challenges. Several factors place the population of persons who might qualify 
for medical aid in dying at greater risk than the general population for 
neurocognitive impairment. 
A high percentage of such patients who request medical aid in dying are 
over age sixty-five.212 And, while persons over age sixty-five do not necessarily 
experience cognitive declines that affect treatment decisionmaking, there is a 
higher incidence of cognitive impairment in persons over age sixty-five than in 
younger persons, and that incidence increases with age.213 A recent study 
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estimated the rate of dementia in persons age seventy-one and older to be 
13.9%.214 There is a growing body of literature examining the treatment 
decisionmaking capacity of older persons, although much of that literature 
focuses on persons who have already been diagnosed as having a condition that 
affects neurocognitive functioning.215 Clinicians tasked with evaluating capacity 
under medical aid in dying statutes must not, of course, substitute presumptions 
related to age or diagnosis of a neurocognitive condition for a criterion-relevant 
evaluation of capacity. Stereotypes and presumptions have historically 
characterized social and clinical expectations of the functional abilities of older 
persons and must be avoided.216  
Substantial individual variability in decisionmaking capacities has been 
observed across patients diagnosed with neurocognitive disorders in those 
studies that have assessed such capacities in the context of consent to participate 
in treatment or research.217 Even within the population of persons diagnosed as 
having a form of dementia, such as Alzheimer’s Disease, “there is sufficient 
heterogeneity such that one cannot simply equate dementia with incapacity.”218 
Jennifer Moye and colleagues have found that “most individuals with mild 
dementia can participate in decision making as defined by legal standards for 
competency,” particularly with additional supports to compensate for areas in 
which there may be deficits.219 Furthermore, studies indicate that some 
decisionmaking domains are affected to a greater extent than others in mild to 
moderate neurocognitive conditions.220 Clinicians involved in medical aid in 
dying capacity assessments should be knowledgeable about possible age-related 
changes and neurocognitive conditions that might affect evaluated patients. 
Such background will promote sensitivity to potential deficits. It may also 
facilitate practitioner enhancement of capacity with cognitive and memory 
supports. 
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Studies reveal that patients with certain terminal illnesses may be at higher 
risk than the general population of experiencing impairments in cognition.221 
Some of these effects may be caused by the progress of the disease itself. Certain 
cancers interfere with facets of brain functioning.222 Patients with advanced 
heart failure may experience altered supply of oxygen and other nutrients to the 
brain, leading to cognitive deterioration.223 It is commonly recognized that 
powerful chemotherapeutic agents used in the treatment of some cancers can 
have a deleterious impact on cognitive functioning.224 Radiation treatment may 
also affect cognitive functioning.225 Finally, other concomitants of terminal 
illness such as fatigue, cognitive overload, demands of treatment regimens and 
medical decisions, financial worries, efforts devoted to putting “affairs in order,” 
and concerns about loved ones may take a cumulative toll on cognitive 
functioning. Studies reveal a wide range of possible impairment, both in severity 
and in the aspects of functioning affected.226 The effects of all of the phenomena 
just cited vary substantially across patients. 
Some studies have revealed manifestations of cognitive impairment in 
hospice patients in cases where clinical staff have not diagnosed or treated such 
conditions.227 The “relationships between cognitive impairment and the nature 
and quality of decision making in various domains among hospice patients” have 
not been the subject of investigation until recently.228 Thus, little is known about 
“whether and to what degree cognitive impairment fluctuates over time and what 
the effects of such fluctuations are on . . . decision making[.]”229  
Two studies by Elissa Kolva and colleagues provide a bit more data.230 In 
one study, the researchers evaluated a sample of persons in a palliative care 
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hospital with a diagnosis of a terminal illness and life expectancy not to exceed 
six months.231 Administering the MacCAT-T,232 the researchers found:  
[S]tudy participants demonstrated a range of decision-making abilities across 
the MacCAT-T subscales. . . . However, a surprisingly large proportion of 
participants (75%) did not evidence significant decisional impairment on any 
of the MacCAT subscales. These findings echo the results found in studies 
in other medically ill populations including Alzheimer’s disease, malignant 
glioma, and mild cognitive impairment; merely having a life-limiting illness 
is not pathognomonic for impaired decisional capacity. However, when 
present, decisional impairment may impact treatment choice.233 
Of particular note, the researchers found no “significant association between 
MacCAT subscales and measures of depression and anxiety.”234  
Kolva and colleagues found higher levels of impairment in decisionmaking 
capacity of terminally ill patients with cancer in a palliative care hospital in a 
second study.235 In this study, the ill subjects were compared with 
demographically matched healthy volunteers from the community.236 The 
comparisons revealed statistically significant differences between the groups, 
and deficits in patients that varied across competence standards.237 In this 
sample, approximately half of the patient participants manifested impairment on 
the Understanding and Appreciation scales, while 85.4% revealed impairment 
on the Reasoning scale.238 The researchers hypothesized that outpatient 
palliative care patients would likely perform better on these measures than did 
the inpatient sample in the instant study.239 They also reported poor agreement 
between clinician judgments of decisionmaking capacity and the MacCAT-T, 
with the measures more sensitive to impairments.240  
While patients in the age and illness demographics most commonly 
associated with requests for medical aid in dying may be at greater risk than 
persons in the general population of experiencing a cognitive impairment 
affecting treatment decisionmaking capacity, the findings of Kolva and her 
colleagues’ suggest that substantial variability in cognitive capacity exists within 
this population. If there are deleterious effects on treatment decisionmaking 
capacity due to age, neurocognitive deficits, or deterioration in medical status, 
the effects will likely vary in severity across patients. Individual patients may 
also vary in capacity across the treatment decisionmaking domains measured by 
four competence standards. On the other hand, we cannot discern from the 
studies cited above how comparable these research samples are to the narrow 
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and self-selected population of patients who actually seek medical aid in dying. 
One expert observed that the process of obtaining a prescription under the 
medical aid in dying law is a “marker of fortitude.”241 That is, the legislatively 
mandated procedural steps require substantial proactivity and perseverance, 
manifested at a time when such efforts are likely highly burdensome in light of 
a patient’s physical and psychological limitations. Thus, persons with severe 
cognitive (and other psychological) impairments will be less likely to proceed 
down this path and successfully follow through with the multiple statutory 
requirements. Thus, while Kolva and colleagues’ findings are illuminating and 
underscore the need for careful evaluation of persons requesting medical aid in 
dying, they do not necessarily predict findings in the population of persons 
seeking medical aid in dying. 
As in the case of mental disorders, a criterion-relevant assessment is 
essential to address the question of whether a neurocognitive limitation impairs 
treatment decisionmaking capacity. Even diagnosis of a neurocognitive 
condition does not necessarily render an individual unable to meet competence 
standards.242 Incapacity should not be presumed from a clinical diagnosis but 
must be evaluated with criterion-relevant measures. Depending on the source of 
the impairment, assessment at a different time of day, or after certain 
medications have cleared from the patient’s system, may allow for a less-
impaired manifestation of the patients’ decisionmaking abilities. Finally, it is 
possible that supportive interventions, such as educational or pharmacological 
interventions, may improve decisionmaking capacity.243 
c. Early Data from University of California, San Francisco 
Medical Center 
The University of California San Francisco Medical Center (UCSFMC) 
has developed an evidence-based assessment protocol to conduct mental health 
evaluations of persons requesting lethal prescriptions under California’s End of 
Life Option Act.244 UCSFMC opted to require all patients who seek medical aid 
in dying to be evaluated by the mental health team. Although California law 
does not require this step for all patients, UCSFMC made this policy decision 
“because of psychiatry’s expertise in assessment of decisional capacity in 
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general” and because of the centrality of this assessment to the statutory 
requirements.245 While some may critique this decision as unduly burdensome 
on patients who do not require a mental health assessment under the statute,246 
the process will allow for a more comprehensive picture of the mental health 
status of all persons seeking medical aid in dying at UCSFMC. Five of the first 
six persons evaluated were determined to be capable under the statute; the sixth 
person was not found to be capable.247 The authors draw the following 
conclusions: 
As reflected in the case vignettes, the impact of psychiatric illness and 
psychiatric status regarding [medical aid in dying] requests in our cases was 
dimensional, not categorical. Mild to moderate depressive disorder typically 
does not affect cognitive status so profoundly as to render a patient incapable 
of decisional capacity, even for [medical aid in dying]. Similarly, mild 
cognitive impairment . . . may be compatible with intact decisional capacity 
for [medical aid in dying].248  
IV.  CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ASSESSMENT OF CAPACITY TO DECIDE 
REGARDING MEDICAL AID IN DYING 
The statutes of jurisdictions that have enacted medical aid in dying laws in 
the United States provide some initial guidance as to the meaning of key terms. 
Some observers have concluded that the criteria laid out in the statutes are 
“incomplete,” “provid[ing] insufficient guidance for [health care professionals] 
in their assessment of the patient’s decisionmaking process.”249 Kim 
characterizes the statutory language in some jurisdictions as “tautological or 
empty definition[s] of incapacity" that tell us no more than that incapable 
patients are those who lack “the ability to make and communicate health care 
decisions.”250 Yet, the statutes are sufficiently clear in establishing that mental 
disorder, psychological symptomatology, or depression are not disqualifying 
without further demonstration of impaired decisionmaking about medical aid in 
dying. While further delineation of the competence standards would be helpful, 
the drafters may have chosen instead to allow health care practitioners to rely on 
the scientific literature, clinical training, and guidance from their disciplines and 
institutions when conducting competence evaluations.251 In this Part, I briefly 
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survey some of the guidance that has emerged and integrate it with the findings 
discussed in this Article.  
A. EVALUATION PROCEDURES  
There is a broad consensus in the scientific and clinical literatures that 
evaluations of capacity to make treatment decisions must incorporate data from 
multiple sources.252 This consensus exists both generally and with specific 
reference to medical aid in dying.253 Medical aid in dying decisional capacity 
evaluations should assess the individual’s functioning with enough breadth to 
allow causal inferences about how any observed functional deficits in the 
relevant statutorily required capacities relate to underlying psychological or 
medical conditions.254 The broader picture of the individual’s functioning may 
facilitate strategies to enhance capacity, where needed, and may assist 
practitioners in offering patients targeted mental health services, where 
appropriate.  
Although medical aid in dying is still a relatively new and infrequent 
intervention in U.S. jurisdictions, the scientific and clinical literature addressing 
mental health consultation consists of a solid and growing body of resources,255 
complemented by documents developed by professional task forces and 
advisory groups.256 The literature includes reports by those directly involved 
with the implementation of the medical aid in dying laws in the authorizing 
jurisdictions.257 For example, the UCSFMC has developed an evidence-based 
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Psychiatric Assessment Protocol for evaluation of requests under the California 
End of Life Option Act, which incorporates the MacArthur competence 
standards as well as other clinical and diagnostic data.258 The care and 
transparency that has characterized the development and implementation of the 
standards and procedures at UCSFMC and other institutions can guide those 
who do not have the benefit of similar institutional resources. 
One practical limitation to conduct of comprehensive mental health 
evaluations has been observed.259 Patients requesting medical aid in dying are 
often experiencing significant debilitation and discomfort. Participating in the 
basic medical aid in dying eligibility evaluation can be quite burdensome for 
these patients, and many are unable to complete it. The mental health evaluation 
superimposes another layer of time-consuming appointments on that basic 
qualification process. Therefore, mental health professionals must balance 
comprehensiveness with concessions to the realities of the patient’s situation. 
Otherwise, the mental health evaluation process risks creating insurmountable 
barriers to access for some patients.260 
B. COMPETENCE STANDARDS AND MEASURES 
Subpart III.A. above interprets the language of medical aid in dying 
statutes. The statutes appear to define capacity as the ability to make and 
communicate a decision regarding medical aid in dying. More specifically, the 
statutes require patient understanding of the information provided by the 
attending practitioner, and appreciation of the meaning of that information. Less 
clarity exists, however, as to whether the statutes require evidence of a logical 
reasoning process in patients’ use of that information. One might infer that the 
legislatures intended that the capacity evaluation examine patient reasoning 
because many statutes indicate that an informed decision is one that is based on 
the information provided. Even if not explicitly mentioned in the statutes, a 
logical reasoning process may be implicit in the broader mandate to assess 
patients’ “capacity to make medical decisions,”261 particularly in light of the 
importance of reasoning ability to effective decisionmaking.  
In the context of medical aid in dying, there is substantial consensus in the 
professional and scientific literature, and in recommendations of advisory 
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groups and task forces, that capacity evaluations should incorporate criterion-
relevant assessment on all four of the standards included in the MacArthur 
group’s work. For example, in one of the earliest and most frequently cited 
discussions of capacity evaluations under the Oregon statute, James Werth and 
colleagues recommend that all four standards be evaluated, despite the lack of 
explicit reference to “reasoning” in the Oregon statute.262 Documents 
disseminated by the California Psychological Association and the American 
Psychiatric Association highlight consideration of all four standards of 
competence in capacity assessments.263 
These sources typically avoid prescribing particular measures, while 
referencing the MacCAT-T or other instruments as examples of tools that can 
facilitate the assessment of the four dimensions of treatment decisionmaking 
capacity. One of the strengths of the MacCAT-T is that it provides a template 
that allows evaluators to customize the assessment inquiry and to tailor the 
interview questions and scoring guidelines to each treatment decisionmaking 
context (and each unique fact pattern that characterizes each patient’s health care 
situation and choices). Yet, this flexibility also increases the likelihood that there 
may be variability in how individual examiners use the tool. The use of the 
MacCAT-T by clinicians might be enhanced with the development of standard 
items targeting assessment of capacity to decide about medical aid in dying. 
Such a tool could be used as an adjunct to the examiner-customized application 
of the MacCAT-T. Evaluators still must face the question of how high the scores 
must be on the various scales in order to find a patient competent. This issue is 
discussed in detail below.264  
The evaluative criteria used by examiners focus primarily on cognitive 
decisionmaking skills. Yet, there may be substantial emotionality associated 
with a patient’s decision to request medical aid in dying. Furthermore, when a 
patient experiences a mental disorder, emotional factors may have an impact on 
cognition. The assessment, however, must remain focused on the impact of any 
such factors on the cognitive tasks required for competence. Analysis of the 
causative role of emotional factors can assist in the explanation for any observed 
deficits in capacity.265  
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C. THE “THRESHOLD”: THE LINE BETWEEN COMPETENCE AND 
INCOMPETENCE  
Identification of the substantive areas of functioning that are the focus of 
capacity evaluations does not resolve the problem of where to draw the line 
between competence and incompetence. While one of the standards, expression 
of choice, is a dichotomous variable, the scales measuring the other three 
standards are continuous variables.266 How high must the levels of 
understanding, appreciation, and reasoning be to lead to a conclusion that the 
patient meets the legal criterion of capacity under the statute? In developing the 
MacCAT-T, Grisso and Appelbaum expressly declined to set such thresholds, 
recognizing that such decisions are policy matters that reflect a number of 
considerations relevant to each treatment context or decision.267 
Some scholars emphasize the importance of examining the consequences 
of a particular treatment decision when setting the threshold for competence.268 
Some have focused on what they characterize as the “gravity” of the choice, that 
is, the seriousness of the consequences of the decision.269 This latter factor seems 
to argue for a higher threshold of competence for life and death decisions such 
as a request for physician aid in ending one’s life. Yet, on second look, focusing 
solely on the possibility that death may result from a patient’s choice is 
insufficiently nuanced. Not all life and death choices are the same. For example, 
the choice of death by a person who rejects a treatment with low risk that offers 
an excellent prognosis for a long, relatively healthy life is not the same as the 
choice of death by a person who is suffering greatly and for whom there is a six-
month life expectancy and no available life-saving treatment. The consequences 
of a decision cannot be viewed as determined solely by the fact that death is the 
outcome of one of the choices. 
While simple formulas are unlikely to capture the complexity of individual 
treatment scenarios, Kim correctly observes that “it is widely accepted that the 
level of abilities required—the threshold for competence—increases as the risk-
to-benefit ratio increases.”270 In elaborating upon this “sliding scale” model, 
Grisso and Appelbaum point out that “[a]s a general rule, a lower threshold for 
competence is set when a patient is accepting a treatment option” with a high 
benefit, low risk profile.271 By contrast, “a somewhat higher threshold for 
 
 266. See ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE 
DECISION MAKING 26 (1990); Hindmarch et al., supra note 168, at 54 (observing that “impairment” of treatment 
decisionmaking abilities “lie on continua,” while the judgment of whether a patient is competent is “binary” and 
“normative,” requiring one to address the question of “how much ability a patient” must demonstrate to be 
determined competent). 
 267. MACCAT-T MANUAL, supra note 86, at 2. 
 268. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 24–26; KIM, supra note 89, at 34. 
 269. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 119 (describing, although not necessarily endorsing, the 
view that “[i]f the consequences to welfare are grave, the need to certify that the patient possesses the requisite 
capacities increases,” with particular attention to “serious risk of death” as such a grave consequence). 
 270. KIM, supra note 89, at 34–35. 
 271. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 25. 
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competence may be required for patients who are refusing” high benefit-low risk 
treatments.272 Grisso and Appelbaum propose the mirror image thresholds for 
low benefit-high risk treatment scenarios. Of course, some fact patterns are 
murkier. Some risk-benefit ratios fall somewhere in between high benefit-low 
risk and low benefit-high risk. Sometimes high risks are paired with high 
benefits, and low risks with low benefits. Sometimes the certainty regarding the 
risks, benefits, and outcomes is less clear. And sometimes there is disagreement 
in the medical community as to these factors. The complexity of the analysis 
varies from situation to situation but will often turn on more than the fact that 
death is an outcome of an option. 
Why is the risk-benefit profile of a choice a factor in determining the 
threshold at which we determine competence or incompetence? Ruth Faden and 
Tom Beauchamp articulate the tensions that are inherent in our society’s 
regulation of patients’ health care decisions: 
The selection of abilities, thresholds, and tests will depend on moral and 
policy questions closely related to the concerns that shape the selection of 
requirements for informed consent . . . . Central issues include the number of 
moral principles to be balanced and the weight to be given to each principle 
in different circumstances. In determinations of the competence of 
patients[,] . . . the evaluative tradeoff is usually between two principles—the 
principle of respect for autonomy, on the one hand, and that of beneficence, 
on the other.273 
The doctrine of informed consent is grounded on the notion that each of us 
has the right to govern what happens to our own bodies.274 This concept is an 
expression of the foundational moral, ethical, and legal notion of autonomy,275 
now embedded as well in constitutional concepts of liberty.276 Yet, in our 
society, the state’s parens patriae interest in our welfare (and in particular, those 
amongst us who may be more vulnerable and less capable), provides it with 
authority to interfere in our lives to promote our best interests. The bioethical 
concepts of beneficence and nonmaleficence encompass such paternalistic 
regulation.277  
Governmental regulation of every health care decision expresses a 
reconciliation of the inherent tensions in balancing autonomy and beneficence. 
Decisions regarding which competence standards to include in an evaluation, 
and the thresholds to be used in applying those standards, are often 
 
 272. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 25. 
 273. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 67, at 291; see also Ganzini et al., supra note 146, at 599 
(“Thresholds for levels of incompetence vary by situation and may reflect social goals in tension—the degree to 
which society seeks to strike a balance between self-determination and protection of the patient. Standards and 
thresholds develop through discussion, debate, consensus, and legal decisions about competence to make 
particular decisions or to perform specific acts.”).   
 274. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 275. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 101–02, 121-25. 
 276. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–50 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–24 (1990). 
 277. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 150–54, 202–06. 
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manifestations of that reconciliation. Indeed, the modern history of states’ 
policies regarding medical aid in dying demonstrates an evolution in the way 
these interests have been reconciled over time. 
In 1997, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 
that Washington’s asserted “unqualified interest in the preservation of human 
life” could constitutionally guide that state’s policy choice to criminalize aid in 
dying for terminally ill persons in the state.278 The Court contrasted the policy 
choice made by the state of Washington with a “sliding-scale” approach that 
would have allowed its interest in preserving life to be balanced against the 
autonomy interests of those with terminal illnesses.279 By 2008, however, the 
state of Washington reversed its policy choice, adopting that sliding-scale 
approach and allowing the autonomy interests of those who meet certain narrow 
statutory requirements to override the state’s interest in preserving life.280 In so 
doing, the legislature also provided some indication of where it placed the 
threshold for competence. 
Tracking the language in the Oregon statute, the Washington legislature 
defined competence as “the ability to make and communicate an informed 
decision to health care providers.”281 As in the ordinary health care context, the 
legislature characterized an “informed decision,” as one that “is based on an 
appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully informed” of the basic 
elements of disclosure.282 In the context of medical aid in dying, those elements 
include disclosures regarding the patient’s condition, prognosis, risks, benefits, 
and alternatives to medical aid in dying. The legislature provided for greater 
scrutiny of capacity in the medical aid in dying context by requiring the 
assessment of capacity by a mental health specialist when an attending physician 
or consulting physician believes the patient “may be suffering from a psychiatric 
or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment.”283 In such 
cases, the legislature required certification from that mental health professional 
that the patient “is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or 
depression causing impaired judgment.”284 The legislature could have, but did 
not, distinguish the level of capacity needed to demonstrate competence from 
that required for other health care decisions or other decisions made at the end 
of life relating to survival. Its focus was, instead, on attaining a higher level of 
certainty about the patient’s competence. In particular, it sought to achieve that 
heightened level of certainty through assessment by a specialist that any 
depression or mental disorder experienced by a patient was not impairing that 
patient’s ability to render a competent treatment decision.  
 
 278. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728–29 (1997). 
 279. Id. at 729. 
 280. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.020 (2019). 
 281. Id. at § 70.245.010(3). 
 282. Id. at § 70.245.010(7). 
 283. Id. at § 70.245.060. 
 284. Id. 
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It is noteworthy that the Washington statute, and statutes of other states, do 
not characterize the inquiry as assessing capacity to make decisions regarding 
physician aid in dying. They focus more generically on the capacity to make 
health care decisions.285 These legislatures, therefore, signaled their intent that 
the assessment of treatment decisionmaking capacity in this context should 
apply the same standards used to assess capacity for other health care decisions 
and a similar threshold in drawing the line between capacity and incapacity.  
Indeed, by narrowing the eligible population of patients to those whose 
illnesses are expected to cause a natural death within six months, the legislature 
has identified a subset of individuals whose autonomy interests are given greater 
weight when balanced against the state’s interests in preserving life. The 
legislature’s policy choice does not value the lives of those who are closer to 
death any less than the lives of other citizens.286 Rather, in light of the 
inevitability and proximity of eligible patients’ deaths, it grants those patients 
weightier autonomy rights in decisions regarding the timing and manner of their 
deaths. This elevates those patients’ authority to make personal choices of when 
and how to die. Yet, in a critical expression of the state’s parens patriae interests 
in protecting those who are vulnerable, it restricts this exercise of 
decisionmaking autonomy to those patients who are competent, with special 
attention to whether a patient’s decisionmaking capacities are impaired by 
mental disorder or other psychological symptomatology.  
The risk-benefit profile of a treatment decision becomes relevant in setting 
the threshold for competence under the sliding-scale model because ethical 
values instruct us to be particularly mindful of protecting those who are not 
capable of exercising autonomy when the risks to their welfare from particular 
choices are great. In other words, we scrutinize patient decisionmaking more 
carefully when a person whose competence is uncertain makes a choice that 
entails serious risks.287 Kim asserts that:  
[T]he goal of conducting a capacity evaluation is not simply to ensure that a 
patient’s right to self-determination is preserved, but also to protect the 
incompetent from harm. Thus, a capacity determination must incorporate 
welfare considerations. What this shows is not that the welfare-sensitive 
sliding scale disregards the autonomy principle but rather that, from a 
societal point of view, when it comes to decisionally impaired persons 
(whose capacity status is uncertain), there is a strong societal interest in 
making sure that their welfare is protected to the extent consistent with their 
[capacity for] self-determination.288 
The drafters of the Washington statute and the statutes of other jurisdictions 
permitting medical aid in dying made several choices with the goal of protecting 
the welfare of patients. One such choice is the limitation of access to medical 
 
 285. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245(3). 
 286. The Court in Washington v. Glucksberg implied that allowing such persons to end their lives with 
physician assistance would have expressed such devaluation. See 521 U.S. 702, 729 (1997). 
 287. KIM, supra note 89, at 36. 
 288. KIM, supra note 89, at 36. 
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aid in dying to patients who are within six months of the end of their lives due 
to a terminal illness. Another such choice is incorporation of procedures likely 
to maximize the certainty of capacity determinations. Not only do two 
physicians evaluate the patient according to a range of statutory qualifications, 
but patients must be referred for a mental health consultation when there are 
concerns about capacity, with special attention to the possible effect that mental 
disorder or psychological symptomatology might be having on decisionmaking 
capacity. It does not appear that these legislatures intended that, in addition to 
these protections, a higher threshold for capacity would be applied than is 
employed in other important decisions made by those whose illnesses bring them 
close to the end of life.289 
D. EXPERTISE AND TRAINING TO PERFORM TREATMENT DECISIONMAKING 
CAPACITY ASSESSMENTS 
One team of health care professionals, in discussing the challenges to the 
implementation of California’s End of Life Option Act, observed that the statute 
assumed “that all physicians are skilled at assessing decisionmaking 
capacity.”290 Yet, available research indicates “a lack of education in 
[decisionmaking capacity assessment, which leads] to calls for compulsory 
training for physicians.”291 It is unlikely that the average health care practitioner 
is aware of the available evidence-based decisionmaking capacity assessment 
strategies and tools. Most clinicians are likely to be unfamiliar with the debates, 
challenges, and pitfalls relevant to the conduct of such evaluations. Even mental 
health professionals, as a group, may be unprepared to perform these 
evaluations. Indeed, one survey of psychiatrists in Oregon revealed that very few 
were confident about their ability to evaluate the capacity of patients under the 
medical aid in dying statute.292  
 
 289. As the analysis in Part C indicates, I conclude that the legislatures did not intend to apply a different 
threshold for capacity determinations for medical aid in dying as contrasted with other end of life decisions 
relating to survival. Yet, I recognize that some bioethicists, health care practitioners, and others characterize 
refusals of life-sustaining treatment decisions as ethically distinct from affirmative provision of a means to hasten 
death by medical professionals. For a discussion of the distinction between “killing and letting die,” see 
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 174-86. Some might view medical aid in dying as ethically 
unsupportable because of the affirmative role played by health care professionals in assisting patients to hasten 
death. Others might view this intervention as permissible, yet require a demonstration of higher level of 
decisionmaking capacity in the aid in dying context. I do not elaborate on these positions here because, in the 
jurisdictions that authorize medical aid in dying, the policy choices implicit in these positions have been made 
by the legislatures of those states, reflecting a social consensus of those states’ citizens. 
 290. Petrillo et al., supra note 241, at 884–86. 
 291. Lesley Charles et al., Physician Education on Decision-Making Capacity Assessment, 63 CANADIAN 
FAM. PHYSICIAN e21, e25 (2017) (footnotes omitted). In one study, physicians and other health care 
professionals working in long-term care and hospital settings revealed that their training on performing such 
assessments had been minimal. See Andrea K. Shreve-Neiger et al., Assessing the Need for Decision-Making 
Capacity Education in Hospitals and Long Term Care (LTC) Settings, 34 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 259, 365–67 
(2008). 
 292. Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward Physician-Assisted Suicide, 153 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1469, 1473–74 (1996). 
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Those who take on responsibility for performing decisionmaking capacity 
assessments under the statutes of their respective states require training beyond 
that necessary to be competent for general practice in their fields. Attending 
physicians serve as the gatekeepers for medical aid in dying in most states. 
Patients will not be referred to a consulting mental health professional unless the 
attending physician identifies concerns about the possible impairment of the 
patient’s decisionmaking capacity.293 (Only in Hawaii are all requesting patients 
referred to a mental health consultant for a capacity assessment.294) Thus, 
specialized training for attending practitioners who perform this gatekeeper 
function is necessary to enhance their ability to make such determinations 
consistent with the principles discussed throughout this Article. 
Several areas of expertise are required. First, practitioners must become 
familiar with the theory and scientific foundations of assessment of treatment 
decisionmaking capacity and the relevant evaluation techniques and strategies. 
Knowledge of the MacArthur tools, alternative instruments, and complementary 
clinical strategies will promote more reliable and valid assessments. Without 
adequate and consistent training, agreement among evaluators who perform 
decisional capacity assessments is poor.295 Furthermore, practitioners’ values 
regarding the ethicality of medical aid in dying laws may affect the stringency 
or leniency of their interpretation of legal standards when performing clinical 
assessments in a potentially value-laden area of practice such as medical aid in 
dying.296 The tendencies of personal values to influence clinical determinations 
of capacity have been found to be greater when the standards and procedures for 
such clinician assessments are uncertain.297 Without formal training and 
knowledge of the empirical literature on the relationship between treatment 
decisionmaking capacity and mental disorder, clinicians may presume that 
presence of a mental disorder predisposes patients to incapacity. 
Second, evaluators should have expertise in working with patients who are 
at the end of life and grappling with issues relating to death and dying.298 Such 
expertise is essential so that the evaluator can appreciate the medical features of 
the patient’s situation and how those features might be influencing patients’ 
 
 293. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (2017); D.C. CODE § 7-661.01(4) (2019); ME. STAT. tit. 
22, § 2140(8) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010(5) (2019). 
 294. HAW. REV. STAT. § 372L-4(a)(4) (2019). 
 295. See, e.g., James Armontrout et al., Do Consultation Psychiatrists, Forensic Psychiatrists, Psychiatry 
Trainees, and Health Care Lawyers Differ in Opinion on Gray Area Decision-Making Capacity Cases? A 
Vignette-Based Survey, 57 PSYCHOSOMATICS 472, 475 (2016); Kim et al., supra note 91; Daniel C. Marson et 
al., Consistency of Physician Judgments of Capacity to Consent in Mild Alzheimer’s Disease, 45 J. AM. 
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 453, 456 (1997).  
 296. Ganzini, supra note 146, at 597.  
 297. See Bourgeois et al., supra note 114, at 442–43 (expressing concern that, without training on a “clearly 
defined clinical method” for assessing treatment decisionmaking capacity in the context of medical aid in dying, 
it was possible that “psychiatrists’ own views on the ethics of [medical aid in dying] impact the ultimate decision 
to allow [medical aid in dying]”). 
 298. James L. Werth, Jr., When is a Mental Health Professional Competent to Assess a Person’s Decision 
to Hasten Death?, 9 ETHICS & BEH. 141, 146-47 (1999). 
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choices. In addition, practitioners should have a baseline of experience regarding 
the range of psychological responses patients may have to terminal illness and 
impending death, and to the physiological effects of the condition and treatment 
interventions on the patients’ functioning.  
Third, evaluators must be experienced in identifying and evaluating mental 
disorders. Attending physicians likely require a level of sophistication to enable 
them to screen patients for the purposes of making referrals for mental health 
consultation. Mental health consultants require substantial expertise not only in 
generic mental health assessment, but importantly, on distinguishing between 
the desire to die grounded in depression or mental disorder and a desire to die 
grounded in physical, emotional, and spiritual suffering caused by the terminal 
illness, the dying process, and associated interventions.299 Sophistication and 
expertise in the assessment of these phenomena are essential not only in 
evaluating the impact of these experiences on capacity, but in identifying the 
opportunities for enhancement of decisionmaking capacities where relevant.300 
Enhancement interventions may be most effective if they are designed with 
recognition of the underlying cause of the skills deficit.  
Fourth, in order to execute the functions I discuss in Part V below, 
practitioners must have knowledge of psychotherapeutic, psychosocial, and 
psychopharmacological interventions potentially helpful to persons who are in 
the later phases of dying from a terminal disease. In that Part, I discuss the 
importance of informing patients seeking medical aid in dying about their other 
options, including palliative care interventions that can address the patients’ 
psychological and existential distress and symptoms of a mental disorder.301 
Many health care practitioners are not knowledgeable about the range of 
palliative care interventions that may be available. Therefore, in order to ensure 
that the recommendations discussed in Part V can be implemented, clinicians 
involved in the medical aid in dying consultation process must become 
knowledgeable about such interventions.  
V.  INCORPORATING PSYCHOSOCIAL, PSYCHIATRIC, AND 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGICAL PALLIATIVE CARE RECOMMENDATIONS INTO 
MEDICAL AID IN DYING MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATIONS 
Medical aid in dying statutes in the United States require that attending 
physicians inform patients of various elements of disclosure, such as “feasible 
alternatives or additional treatment opportunities, including, but not limited to, 
comfort care, hospice care, palliative care, and pain control.”302 At a conference 
convened in California in 2015 to address important issues in the 
 
 299. See supra notes 204–210 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 171–179 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 302–314 and accompanying text. 
 302. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(i)(5) (West 2020). The language in the other states is fairly 
similar, although some refer primarily to “comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.” See, e.g., OR. REV. 
STAT. § 127.815(E) (2017). 
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implementation of that state’s then newly passed End of Life Option Act, 
participants observed that the statute does not require that participating health 
care practitioners “be proficient in responding to patients’ end-of-life needs.”303 
In the context of patients who may be suffering from psychological distress or a 
mental disorder, proficiency in responding to patients’ end-of-life care needs 
requires that health care providers recognize that the terms “palliative care” and 
“comfort care” do not refer exclusively to provision of relief for physical pain 
and discomfort associated with illnesses toward the end of life.304 Rather, the 
terms also encompass intervention designed to promote relief from 
psychological suffering.  
Palliative care “is a broad term that refers to care provided at any point in 
the trajectory of an illness for the purpose of alleviating physical and psycho-
social-spiritual suffering, enhancing quality of life, effectively managing 
symptoms, and offering comprehensive, interdisciplinary support to the patient 
and family throughout the course of illness.”305 Palliative care, as contrasted 
with other forms of treatment, does not seek to treat the underlying disease that 
is threatening the patient’s life. Rather, “[i]ts primary goals are to provide 
comfort and care for those with life-limiting illnesses and their families.”306 
The California conference presenters underscored that “providers must 
explore, acknowledge, and address issues that may be contributing to patients’ 
unbearable suffering, including spiritual or physical distress, or lack of social 
support. . . . Providers may need training to develop these skills.”307 Even 
among those who deliver palliative care services, there may be inadequate focus 
on psychological needs. Brian Kelly and colleagues observe that “[d]espite its 
ubiquitous nature, . . . psychological distress in palliative patients tends to be 
under-diagnosed and under-treated.”308 Scholars and practitioners who 
specialize in providing palliative care emphasize the essential interrelationship 
of physical and psychological distress, and the need to target both sets of 
symptoms.309 In the ideal world, those patients who meet the terminal disease 
requirement for medical aid in dying in U.S. jurisdictions would already be 
 
 303. Petrillo et al., supra note 241, at 886. 
 304. In addition, the terms “palliative care” or “comfort care” are not synonymous with hospice care. While 
palliative care can be provided at any point in the trajectory of an illness, and individuals need not be dying to 
be considered appropriate recipients of such services, hospice “refers to an aspect of palliative care devoted to 
alleviating symptoms and enhancing quality of life during the last six months of life for patients who accept that 
disease-directed therapy can no longer benefit them.” Julia E. Kasl-Godley et al., Opportunities for Psychologists 
in Palliative Care: Working with Patients and Families Across the Disease Continuum, 69 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
364, 365 (2014). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Chochinov, supra note 15, at 85. 
 307. Petrillo et al., supra note 241, at 886. 
 308. Kelly et al., supra note 15, at 780; see also Mystakidou et al., supra note 135, at 261 (emphasizing “the 
importance of incorporating mental health care into traditional models of palliative care”). 
 309. Chochinov, supra note 15, at 84; Robin B. Rome et al., The Role of Palliative Care at the End of Life,  
11 OCHSNER J. 348, 348–49 (2011) (discussing the concept of “total pain,” viewing the patient’s “physical, 
psychological, social, and spiritual pain” as an interrelated phenomenon requiring coordinated intervention). 
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receiving palliative care from an interdisciplinary team that incorporates 
interventions targeting the patient’s psychological distress and any mental health 
conditions or symptoms. Yet, many patients who are within six months of their 
predicted end of life might not be receiving integrated palliative care targeting 
the range of their physical and psychological needs. They may not even have 
been evaluated by a mental health professional. As such, a referral to a mental 
health professional under the medical aid in dying statutes presents an 
opportunity to further identify the patient’s need for relief of suffering and to 
provide essential services.  
Those patients who are referred for mental health evaluation—whether or 
not they are found to be competent under the medical aid in dying statutes—
deserve the opportunity to receive palliative care services that address not only 
their physical pain and discomforts, but also their psychological suffering. Such 
referrals, ideally to palliative care specialists, should become a formal 
component of mental health evaluations performed under the statute. The 
statutory obligation for health care practitioners to inform patients of their 
feasible alternatives should, without question, incorporate a sophisticated 
discussion of the palliative care options that might alleviate psychological 
suffering and assist the patient and his or her family in coping with the 
impending death. Patients found to be ineligible to receive medical aid in dying 
due to decisional incapacity may be experiencing relatively severe mental health 
symptoms. Referral to those who can provide psychological or psychiatric 
palliative care is imperative. In addition, some competent patients might choose 
to delay hastening death by means of medical aid in dying if made aware that 
such interventions might provide some relief from their suffering.310 Only with 
 
 310. While there has not been substantial empirical work directly examining this hypothesis, the research 
literature provides some support. One study found that treatment of depression did not alter mild to moderately 
depressed patients’ preferences to terminate life-sustaining treatment, but did alter the preferences of some more 
severely depressed patients. Linda Ganzini et al., The Effect of Depression Treatment on Elderly Patients’ 
Preferences for Life-Sustaining Medical Therapy, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1631, 1631, 1635 (1994). More 
generally, there are studies that indicate that cancer patients can, in some instances, receive relief from 
psychological distress and symptoms of mental disorder with mental health intervention. See, e.g., Nathan 
Fairman & Scott A. Irwin, Palliative Care Psychiatry: Update on an Emerging Dimension of Psychiatric 
Practice, 15 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 374, 374 (2013); Jessica J. Fulton et al., Psychotherapy Targeting 
Depression and Anxiety for Use in Palliative Care: A Meta-Analysis, 21 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1024, 1034–35 
(2018); Miovic & Block, supra note 205, at 1665; Nat’l Insts. of Health State-of-the-Sci. Panel, National 
Institutes of Health State-of-the-Science Conference Statement: Symptom Management in Cancer: Pain, 
Depression, and Fatigue, July 15-17, 2002, 95 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1110, 1113 (2003); Timothy A. Newby, 
et al., Interventions That May Reduce Depressive Symptoms Among Prostate Cancer Patients: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis, 24 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 1686, 1692 (2015); G. Rodin et al., Treatment of Depression 
in Cancer Patients,14 CURRENT ONCOLOGY 180, 186 (2007); Emily Kathryn Stagg & Mark Lazenby, Best 
Practices for the Nonpharmacological Treatment of Depression at the End of Life, 29 AM. J. HOSPICE & 
PALLIATIVE MED. 183, 191–92 (2012). There are also studies that suggest a relationship between a desire for 
death in terminally ill patients and diagnosis of depression or other mental disorders. See supra note 135 and 
accompanying text. Without question, further empirical investigation is necessary to address the question of 
whether the desire to hasten death of terminally ill patients who suffer from psychological distress or a diagnosed 
mental disorder can be reduced with mental health intervention targeting treatment of their psychological distress 
or mental disorder.  
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a full understanding of the ways in which palliative care interventions might 
assist them can patients truly make an informed choice.311 Finally, patients who 
decide to go forward with medical aid in dying may still benefit from such 
interventions before they take the lethal prescription.  
A growing database reveals the efficacy of psychological, psychosocial, 
and psychopharmacological interventions in persons referred for palliative 
care.312 Yet, patients seeking medical aid in dying who experience psychological 
distress or symptomatology will not have the opportunity to consider these 
interventions unless the practitioner gatekeepers take seriously the importance 
of fully and meaningfully informing patients of such options and their possible 
impact on the patients’ suffering.313 In addition, the necessary array of palliative 
services must be available without undue delay in order to benefit persons whose 
time is rapidly diminishing. Some observers have emphasized that, in order to 
meet this challenge, jurisdictions must upgrade the availability of integrated 
palliative care resources.314 
CONCLUSION 
In the past fifty years, the law governing patients’ choices regarding their 
own medical care has shifted dramatically. Although Justice Cardozo uttered his 
famous words—“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body”315—over one hundred years 
ago, patients’ rights to refuse life-saving or life-sustaining treatment were not 
formally recognized until late into the 20th Century. Justice Cardozo’s words 
embody what has become a core value in American bioethics and law: the 
principle of autonomy. Yet, as his language emphasizes, the right to make 
 
 311. One commentator suggests that states add a requirement of consultation with a palliative care specialist 
before patients receive a prescription under the U.S. medical aid in dying laws. Benjamin Shibata, An Ethical 
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personal health care decisions depends on one’s capacity to make those choices. 
Without capacity, the value of autonomy is questionable, and the state’s interest 
in protecting those who cannot decide wisely for themselves becomes weightier. 
Although competent adult patients have generally been authorized to refuse 
or terminate life-sustaining treatments since the late 20th Century, the right to 
receive the assistance of willing medical professionals to hasten death was 
denied until Oregon passed and implemented its Death with Dignity Act. None 
of the ominously predicted dire consequences have materialized during 
Oregon’s experiment over the past quarter century. One by one, nine other 
jurisdictions have joined Oregon to be part of a growing minority of places 
within the United States where competent patients with terminal diseases can 
receive medical assistance to choose the timing and manner of their deaths. 
There are many substantive and procedural safeguards written into these 
laws. One of the most important is the requirement that only patients who are 
competent will be permitted to access medical aid in dying. The statutes create 
a framework that seeks to avoid excessive obstacles to patient choice while 
screening out those patients with decisional impairments. By restricting access 
to medical aid in dying to a narrow subset of ill patients—those who are not 
expected to survive beyond six months due to a terminal disease—jurisdictions 
offering this option to patients have balanced the state’s interest in preserving 
life with the patient’s autonomy interests.  
There is no indication that the legislators in these states intended to require 
demonstration a “higher” level of competence to choose medical aid in dying as 
compared with the threshold applied to other end of life decisions relating to 
survival. The legislatures adopting medical aid in dying statutes established the 
procedural requirement of a referral to a mental health specialist to provide 
greater certainty as to the competence of patients, particularly those viewed as 
being at greater risk of experiencing impairments in capacity. Ironically, while 
some statutes suggest greater scrutiny of persons with depression, empirical data 
reveal that such persons are not generally at greater risk of experiencing 
impaired judgment in health care decisionmaking when evaluated with criterion-
relevant capacity measures. Rather, persons experiencing cognitive deficits in 
the months before death appear to be at greater risk of decisional incapacity.316 
Further research is needed to better understand the relationships among 
decisional capacity and the range of factors that lead to cognitive challenges in 
persons who meet medical eligibility for medical aid in dying.    
Research reveals that there is insufficient attention to the integrated 
psychological and physiological needs of persons at the end of life.317 Regardless 
of the ultimate determination of eligibility for medical aid in dying, persons who 
are experiencing a level of psychological distress or symptomatology sufficient 
to trigger the mental health referral procedure under the medical aid in dying 
 
 316. See supra notes 212–243 and accompanying text. 
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statutes deserve attention to their psychological suffering. Providers must adopt 
a broad formulation of palliative care that incorporates psychosocial, 
psychiatric, and psychopharmacological interventions where it is determined 
that such modalities are appropriate to treat psychological distress, psychiatric 
symptomatology, or a mental disorder. Education of patients about these options 
is inherent in the mandate requiring practitioners to disclose alternatives to 
patients seeking aid in dying. Such disclosure should be coupled with relatively 
rapid access to services for interested patients.  
These recommendations strike a balance between legal and ethical 
principles of autonomy and beneficence. Persons satisfying medical criteria for 
medical aid in dying who are experiencing psychological distress or diagnosed 
mental disorders and meet relevant legal standards of capacity are entitled to 
choose the manner and timing of their deaths without confronting unfair and 
outdated presumptions of incapacity. At the same time, practitioners must 
validate, and offer help for, the psychological suffering that can accompany 
serious illness and impending death. When patients are educated about, and 
given access to, interventions that may provide them with relief from their 
psychological distress and symptoms, we can be more confident that those who 
choose to hasten death have exercised a choice that is grounded in meaningful 
knowledge of alternatives to that decision. 
 
